LCMS Convention Workbook St. Louis, Missouri — 1998, Page 324

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324

THEOLOGICAL DOCUMENTS

until after Luther’s death in 1546. It was a delay Charles regretted deeply
at the end of his life.

At first, at the 1524 Diet of Nuremberg, the German princes sought a
Council of the German church, but the 1526 Recess of Speyer allowed each
sovereign to regulate religion “as the laws of the empire and the Word of
God allowed.” This ambiguous provision seemed to establish a “right of
Reformation” in the law of the empire, and some German princes used it
exactly that way to support the Reformation. It also became a useful tool
for those towns seeking independence from the empire. In general, then,
the success of religious reform depended upon how far princes and
autonomous Imperial cities were willing and able to go in support of it.”
“The Reformation was directed primarily at religious rather than political
concerns,” writes Robert Wuthnow. “But in an age when states and reli-
gion were so closely intertwined, the Reformation necessarily carried
broad political implications and could survive only by receiving some sort
of official sanction.”?! While these civil authorities were generally quite
sincere in their subscription to Reformation teaching, it is also true that
their actions were a continuation of socio-political trends from the Middle
Ages—both a drive for wider social control by magistrates and a desire to
subordinate the clergy to secular jurisdiction.

The Reformation had upset the balance of power in the Holy Roman
Empire and the princes took advantage of the political conflicts aroused by
the Reformation to form new bonds between spiritual and temporal
authority in Germany. While Luther and the other German reformers had
no intention of subordinating the church to civil authorities, the practical
measures of reform depended upon the German princes. As a result, the
princes became the heads of their territorial churches and enlisted those
ecclesiastical resources in support of their territorial interests.

The process of state control was spurred by the German Peasants’
Revolt. By 1525, the reforming work of Luther and Zwingli had spawned

* “Overall, each of the three mayor regions in which the Reformation proved success:
ful—central Eurpe, northem Europe, and England--demonstrate the crucial importance of
the state in initiating and defending the reforms. Town councils, terntonal pances, and cen-
traled monarchies .., held control of many of the resources on which the fate of religious
reforms depended: influence over the selection and payment of clergy, power to mandate
certain styles of public worship, military force or financial levwrage capable of intimidating
interested parties from the outside and quashing popular upheaval from below, legal
authonty to convene religious councils and disputahons, oversight of publishing and book
distribution. and responsibility for doling out public assistance. Where social conditions
made it possible for naling bodies to exercise thew functions at their own discretion, their
role cast a decisive imprint on the Reformation.” Robert Wuthnow, Cemmmurities of Discourse
Ideology and Social Structure im the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and European Socialism (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 81

“Thid., 116

could abuse their authority.> Thus, from a church/state standpoint, the
Protestant Reformation was a mixed blessing. On the one hand, there was
a genuine renewal of the church, thanks to the often courageous acts of
civil authorities; on the other hand, there was increasing control of the
Protestant church by princes, towns* and national monarchies.”

The issue of civil disobedience to the Holy Roman emperor was criti-
cal to the outcome of the Reformation. In Switzerland, where the autono-
my of cities, and even democracy, was already well established, such resis-
tance could be more easily accepted. For Luther, however, the idea of civil
disobedience presented serious difficulties. At first, Luther had subscribed
only to passive resistance and a confession of the truth, while submitting to
the presumably fatal consequences of disobedience. When his life and lib-
erty were at stake following the Edict of Worms in 1521, Luther counseled
his prince not to resist the emperor forcibly. During the Peasants’ Revolt of
1525, Luther was adamant in asserting that “Christians do not fight for
themselves with sword and musket, but with the cross and with suffer-
ing.”** Luther also opposed the formation of a League of Protestant
princes, arguing that only God has the right to punish tyrants. As late as
1530, Luther was still opposing military resistance to the emperor.

*~In his exegetical sermons on the first two chapters of the Gospel of John, 1537.38, he
fuleunated at length against the nobles, princes, and junsts who wish to teach the preachers
what they should preach and wish to force people to che sacrament on the grounds that one
must obey the secular authority. ‘Where the princes in that way mix things together as they
now do, God help us that we do not live long and see such a misfortune, for there the Chris-
tian rehgion must fall in ruins. as happened under Popery, when the bishops became secu-
lar princes. And if now the secular fords become popes and bishops, so that one must preach
tor their benefit and say what thev gladly hear, then the very devil himself preaches; he will
also preach. We, however, may beseech God that both sides refrain from misusing their
office in that way.’ “ Lewis W. Spitz, “Luther's Ecclesiology and His Concept of the Prince
as Notbischot.” Church History 22 (March 1953): 133-34. See LW 22:228.

* The role of the town 1s particularly clear in the Swiss Reformation. Both Zwingl and
Calvin based their reforms in the right of town councils in Zunch and Geneva respectively
to act also as church counals. For Zwinglt, all doctrinal and ecclesiastical questions were to
be settled by the Scnptures and civil government had both the right and the duty to see that
the rulings of Scripture were observed: “As Zwingli understood the problem church and
suciety were one; to maintain the unity of the commonwealth was to defend the church.”
Robert C. Walton, "Was There a Turning Point of the Zwingltian Reformation?” The Men-
nenite Quarterly Review 42, no. 1 January 1968) 56, Drawing heavily upon Old Testament
Israel as a model, Zwingli saw Zurich's social stability as dependent upon a proper obeds-
ence to God. Since, even before the Reformation, the town council already supervised the
appointment and dismissal of clergy, it has been argued that Zwingh (like Luther) was sim-
ply working within the politcal system he inherited

* “Only in those settings in which the central regimes obtained a substantial degree of
fmanaal and administrative autonomy from the landed elite was it possible for Reformahon
ideas to gain active and decisive support.” Wuthnow, 115

*~ admonition to Peace,” LW 46:32.

19

many variations, some of which were quite radical, even revolutionary.
Most of these radical reformers were distressed at what they perceived to
be a lack of moral improvement in society as a result of the work of Luther
and Zwingli. They defended free will in religion and resisted any linking,
together of church and state. When Swabian peasants met in February of
1525, they summarized their grievances in 12 articles. These articles were
aimed at religious and secular leaders alike, who disposed of both proper-
tv and people in an authoritarian manner. The peasants cited and appealed
to Luther, who responded with An Admonition to Peace:

This, then, is a great and dangerous matter. It concerns both the kingdom
of God and the kingdom of the world. If this rebellion were to continue
and get the upper hand, both kingdoms would be destroyed and there
would be neither worldly government nor word of God, which would ulti-
mately result in the permanent destruction of all Germany 7

When the peasants nevertheless took up arms in defense of their “Gospel,”
Luther strongly supported the princes in their ruthless suppression of the
rebellion:

For rebellion is not just simple murder, it is like a great fire, which attacks
and devastates a whole land. Thus rebellion brings with it a land filled
with murder and bloodshed; it makes widows and orphans, and turns
everything upside down, like the worst disaster. Therefore let evervone
who can, smite, slay, and stab, secretly or openly, remembering that noth-
ing can be more poisonous, hurtful, or devilish than a rebel. It is just as
when one must kill a mad dog; if you do not strike him, he will strike you,
and a whole iand with you”!

As a result, Lutheranism never again appealed as much to the social
reformers as it had between 1517 and 1525.

After this Peasants’ Revolt, the princes realized that religious radical-
ism linked to social radicalism was a prescription for disaster. They
resolved, therefore, with Luther's cooperation, to more aggressively man-
age the reforms. The Saxon church visitation of 1527 was groundbreaking,
in that it was the basis for a type of institutionalized reform that had not
been explicitly envisioned previously by any of the reformers.” Luther
acquiesced to this assertion of authority by the princes and called them
“emergency bishops”—although Luther later had misgivings about this,
when he realized how similarly Protestant princes and Catholic bishops

Manin Luther, “Admonition to Peace: A Reply to the Twelve Articles of the Peasants
in Swabia” (15251, LW 46°15.

* Martin Luther, “Agaiost the Robbing and Murdering Hordes of Peasants” (1525), LW
46:50.

‘Seribner, 176

But 1530 was the high-water mark of Luther's refusal to countenance
such military resistance. When Luther, Melanchthon, and Jonas were sum-
moned to a meeting with the prince’s lawyers at Torgau in October of 1530,
there was a long and stormy conversation. Luther finally allowed for the
possibility that the constitution of the empire might permit resistance to
the emperor by princes if the emperor were attacking them solely on the
basis of religion.* It may have seemed to Luther a small concession; it was
not long, however, before the princes were actively preparing for war with
the emperor. By 1536, Luther completely accepted the necessity of this mil-
itary resistance and his mature position is reflected in the Magdeburg Con-
fession of 1550, where so-called “lesser magistrates” are under divine
obligation to defend themselves and those in their charge from unjust per-
secution by a higher authority.”

D. Holy War and Religious Toleration

Once Holy Roman Emperor Charles V had tured in earnest to eradi-
cating Protestantism, it did not take long for religious conflict to become
military conflict. The outcome of the Schmalkaldic War of 1546-47 was
defeat for the Protestants. Finally victorious in Germany, Charles V dictat-
ed the terms of peace at the Diet of Augsburg in 1548. The so-called Augs-
burg “Interim”—it was only temporary, until the Council of Trent could
meet—made some concessions to Protestants (such as allowing married
priests and communion in both bread and wine) but was otherwise
unsympathetic to Protestant concerns. None of the wounds in Germany
were healed. The city of Magdeburg became a bastion of continuing
Protestant resistance, from which a harsh propaganda campaign against
the Augsburg “Interim” was unleashed.

Charles V became embroiled in a renewed religious war in 1552, which
resulted in a collapse so rapid that in 1555 he had to acknowledge defeat in
the Peace of Augsburg. The terms of that peace were complex and eventu-
ally resulted in yet another religious war. But for at least 30 years, a fragile
trace was maintained. Both Catholics and those who subscribed to the
Augsburg Confession of 1530 were guaranteed full personal and legal secu-
rity. Princely sovereignty over religion was recognized on the basis that
where there is one ruler, there should be only one religion. Thus, the free-
dom to embrace Lutheranism or Catholicism was granted only to the indi-

* See Cynthia Grant Schoenberger, “The Development of the Lutheran Theory of Resis-
tance: 1523-1530.” Sixteenth Century Journal 8, no. 1 (April 1977): 61-76.

“See Oliver K. Olson, “Theology of Revolution: Magdeburg, 1550-51,” Sixteenth Cen-
tury Journal 3, no. 1 (April 1972): 56-79

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