Collection › LCMS Convention Workbook (St. Louis, Missouri) › 2026 · 69th Convention, Phoenix › Page 198
LCMS Convention Workbook St. Louis, Missouri — 2026, Page 198
front matter 1
front matter 2
front matter 3
front matter 4
front matter 5
front matter 6
front matter 7
front matter 8
front matter 9
front matter 10
front matter 11
front matter 12
front matter 13
front matter 14
front matter 15
front matter 16
front matter 17
front matter 18
front matter 19
front matter 20
front matter 21
front matter 22
front matter 23
front matter 24
front matter 25
front matter 26
front matter 27
front matter 28
front matter 29
front matter 30
front matter 31
front matter 32
front matter 33
front matter 34
front matter 35
Page 1
Page 2
Page 3
Page 4
Page 5
Page 6
Page 7
Page 8
Page 9
Page 10
Page 11
Page 12
Page 13
Page 14
Page 15
Page 16
Page 17
Page 18
Page 19
Page 20
Page 21
Page 22
Page 23
Page 24
Page 25
Page 26
Page 27
Page 28
Page 29
Page 30
Page 31
Page 32
Page 33
Page 34
Page 35
Page 36
Page 37
Page 38
Page 39
Page 40
Page 41
Page 42
Page 43
Page 44
Page 45
Page 46
Page 47
Page 48
Page 49
Page 50
Page 51
Page 52
Page 53
Page 54
Page 55
Page 56
Page 57
Page 58
Page 59
Page 60
Page 61
Page 62
Page 63
Page 64
Page 65
Page 66
Page 67
Page 68
Page 69
Page 70
Page 71
Page 72
Page 73
Page 74
Page 75
Page 76
Page 77
Page 78
Page 79
Page 80
Page 81
Page 82
Page 83
Page 84
Page 85
Page 86
Page 87
Page 88
Page 89
Page 90
Page 91
Page 92
Page 93
Page 94
Page 95
Page 96
Page 97
Page 98
Page 99
Page 100
Page 101
Page 102
Page 103
Page 104
Page 105
Page 106
Page 107
Page 108
Page 109
Page 110
Page 111
Page 112
Page 113
Page 114
Page 115
Page 116
Page 117
Page 118
Page 119
Page 120
Page 121
Page 122
Page 123
Page 124
Page 125
Page 126
Page 127
Page 128
Page 129
Page 130
Page 131
Page 132
Page 133
Page 134
Page 135
Page 136
Page 137
Page 138
Page 139
Page 140
Page 141
Page 142
Page 143
Page 144
Page 145
Page 146
Page 147
Page 148
Page 149
Page 150
Page 151
Page 152
Page 153
Page 154
Page 155
Page 156
Page 157
Page 158
Page 159
Page 160
Page 161
Page 162
Page 163
Page 164
Page 165
Page 166
Page 167
Page 168
Page 169
Page 170
Page 171
Page 172
Page 173
Page 174
Page 175
Page 176
Page 177
Page 178
Page 179
Page 180
Page 181
Page 182
Page 183
Page 184
Page 185
Page 186
Page 187
Page 188
Page 189
Page 190
Page 191
Page 192
Page 193
Page 194
Page 195
Page 196
Page 197
Page 198
Page 199
Page 200
Page 201
Page 202
Page 203
Page 204
Page 205
Page 206
Page 207
Page 208
Page 209
Page 210
Page 211
Page 212
Page 213
Page 214
Page 215
Page 216
Page 217
Page 218
Page 219
Page 220
Page 221
Page 222
Page 223
Page 224
Page 225
Page 226
Page 227
Page 228
Page 229
Page 230
Page 231
Page 232
Page 233
Page 234
Page 235
Page 236
Page 237
Page 238
Page 239
Page 240
Page 241
Page 242
Page 243
Page 244
Page 245
Page 246
Page 247
Page 248
Page 249
Page 250
Page 251
Page 252
Page 253
Page 254
Page 255
Page 256
Page 257
Page 258
Page 259
Page 260
Page 261
Page 262
Page 263
Page 264
Page 265
Page 266
Page 267
Page 268
Page 269
Page 270
Page 271
Page 272
Page 273
Page 274
Page 275
Page 276
Page 277
Page 278
Page 279
Page 280
Page 281
Page 282
Page 283
Page 284
Page 285
Page 286
Page 287
Page 288
Page 289
Page 290
Page 291
Page 292
Page 293
Page 294
Page 295
Page 296
Page 297
Page 298
Page 299
Page 300
Page 301
Page 302
Page 303
Page 304
Page 305
Page 306
Page 307
Page 308
Page 309
Page 310
Page 311
Page 312
Page 313
Page 314
Page 315
Page 316
Page 317
Page 318
Page 319
Page 320
Page 321
Page 322
Page 323
Page 324
Page 325
Page 326
Page 327
Page 328
Page 329
Page 330
Page 331
Page 332
Page 333
Page 334
Page 335
Page 336
Page 337
Page 338
Page 339
Page 340
Page 341
Page 342
Page 343
Page 344
Page 345
Page 346
Page 347
Page 348
Page 349
Page 350
Page 351
Page 352
Page 353
Page 354
Page 355
Page 356
Page 357
Page 358
Page 359
Page 360
Page 361
Page 362
Page 363
Page 364
Page 365
Page 366
Page 367
Page 368
Page 369
Page 370
Page 371
Page 372
Page 373
Page 374
Page 375
Page 376
Page 377
Page 378
Page 379
Page 380
Page 381
Page 382
Page 383
Page 384
Page 385
Page 386
Page 387
Page 388
Page 389
Page 390
Page 391
Page 392
Page 393
Page 394
Page 395
Page 396
Page 397
Page 398
Page 399
Page 400
Page 401
Page 402
Page 403
Page 404
Page 405
Page 406
Page 407
Page 408
Page 409
Page 410
Page 411
Page 412
Page 413
Page 414
Page 415
Page 416
Page 417
Page 418
Page 419
Page 420
Page 421
Page 422
Page 423
Page 424
Page 425
Page 426
Page 427
Page 428
Page 429
Page 430
Page 431
Page 432
Page 433
Page 434
Page 435
Page 436
Page 437
Page 438
Page 439
Page 440
Page 441
Page 442
Page 443
Page 444
Page 445
Page 446
Page 447
Page 448
Page 449
Page 450
Page 451
Page 452
Page 453
Page 454
Page 455
Page 456
Page 457
Page 458
Page 459
Page 460
Page 461
Page 462
Page 463
Page 464
Page 465
Page 466
Page 467
Page 468
Page 469
Page 470
Page 471
Page 472
Page 473
Page 474
Page 475
Page 476
Page 477
Page 478
Page 479
Page 480
Page 481
Page 482
Page 483
Page 484
Page 485
Page 486
Page 487
Page 488
Page 489
Page 490
Page 491
Page 492
Page 493
Page 494
Page 495
Page 496
Page 497
Page 498
Page 499
Page 500
Page 501
Page 502
Page 503
Page 504
Page 505
Page 506
Page 507
Page 508
Page 509
Page 510
Page 511
Page 512
Page 513
Page 514
Page 515
Page 516
Page 517
Page 518
Page 519
Page 520
Page 521
Page 522
Page 523
Page 524
Scan: The Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod
⤓ Download page image (full resolution)
Transcription machine transcription, uncorrected
198
THEOLOGICAL DOCUMENTS—COMMISSION ON THEOLOGY AND CHURCH RELATIONS
T H E O L O G I C A L F O U N DAT I O N S
D. The Question of Euthanasia and What It Really Means
Lutheran catechesis reinforces the truth that the Fifth Commandment calls upon us to “fear and love God so that we do
not hurt or harm our neighbor in his body, but help and support him in every physical need.”70 The Ramsey Colloquium’s
directive “always to care, never to kill”71 echoes this tradition. “For Christians, each person’s life is a divine gift and trust,
taken up into God’s own eternal life in Jesus, to be guarded and respected in others and in oneself.”72
Physician-assisted suicide may escape the technical meaning of euthanasia since it “only” involves the physician in
prescribing the drugs that will end life when taken by the patient. Such specious logic cannot evade the fact that purposefully enabling an act is to participate in it. There is a difference, however, between enabling death and accepting its
inevitability. “Deeply embedded in our moral and medical traditions is the distinction between allowing to die, on the one
hand, and killing on the other.”73
Christian ethicists have made a strong case for the right to refuse or withhold medical treatments if they are either
“useless or excessively burdensome.”74 But, even here, to reject a treatment must never devolve into rejecting a life. It
engages others in a conspiracy to abandon, to kill another human being. Only flights of sophistry can disguise the fact that
despite all the language regarding choice and self-determination, euthanasia represents a license to kill.
The experience of the Netherlands may prove instructive. Euthanasia has been known to be regularly practiced in the
Netherlands since 1973, even prior to the current more permissive law.75 Indeed, one might argue that the 2001 law sought
to make legal what had been practiced behind closed doors in the previous decades.76 The official guidelines now require
that the patient’s decision is “voluntary, well considered and persistent, in the presence of unbearable pain without hope
of improvement.”77 They mandate the consultation with more than one doctor and concurrence between the physician
and the patient that euthanasia is the only reasonable option. Despite claims that the Dutch experience has been “virtually
abuse-free,” studies have consistently shown that cases of voluntary euthanasia have been underreported by less than half
of the actual cases for a variety of reasons (e.g., fear of being challenged for how strictly one followed the guidelines in the
law).78 Since 2002, euthanasia is regulated by the Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures)
Act. Rates for officially reported euthanasia have risen steadily in the Netherlands, from under 2% of all deaths in 2002
to more than 4% in 2019.79 But major skepticism exists as to how accurate the official numbers are, given the incentive to
avoid scrutiny, additional paperwork and the refusal by some physicians to report their euthanasia cases.
70
Luther’s Small Catechism with Explanation, 14.
71
The Ramsey Colloquium, “Always to Care, Never to Kill,” 45.
72
Meilaender, Bioethics: A Primer for Christians, 76–77.
73
The Ramsey Colloquium, “Always to Care, Never to Kill,” 45.
74
This distinction occurs repeatedly in the literature and is enshrined in Meilaender’s influential work.
T H E O L O G I C A L F O U N DAT I O N S
The experience of the Netherlands with its permission to euthanize provides us with a warning about the trajectory
of a society that surrenders the sanctity-of-life ethic and the protection of the weak and vulnerable. One suspects that in
a world of limited resources, the permission to die will soon morph into a duty to die. Heads of nursing homes, eldercare
attorneys and others in the senior living sector have reported dealing with greedy relatives trying to find a way to limit the
expense of care for a frail relative.80 Imagine if the person lived in a jurisdiction where the law permitted physician-assisted
suicide. Would terminally ill seniors be pressured to become “compassionate heroes” for their families to preserve more of
the inheritance? Common sense tells us that they would. The conjoining of legal permission with social acceptance would
result not in more freedom, but in less.81
Unfortunately, the logic of providing euthanasia leaves us with a major dilemma exposed by the Netherlands experience. Typically, euthanasia policies say that we should offer it as a right both because of our claims to self-determination
and in order to relieve suffering for the terminally ill. However, we have noted earlier (see “The Quest for Absolute
Autonomy”) that oftentimes these two criteria are separated in practice.
Meilaender has provided a strong defense of the rejection of euthanasia and affirmation of “double-effect” reasoning.82
With respect to euthanasia, he offers four simple observations. First, physicians are obliged to do what they can to relieve
the suffering of their patients. Here the “can” must be limited to “morally can.” A physician would be prohibited from doing
something that would relieve suffering but violate a moral code. Second, refusing to approve actions that are intended to
kill the patient does not imply that we must do everything possible to keep the person alive (e.g., it is sound medicine and
morally appropriate to refuse treatments that are useless or excessively burdensome). Third, the freedom to order one’s own
life is not absolute. We may not marry our sister, sell one of our kidneys to the highest bidder or take certain drugs. Fourth,
genuine compassion must respect the boundaries established by the Creator-creature divide. Hence, “we cannot give
ultimate authority over our life to another human being, nor are we authorized to exercise such authority over another.”83
Brian Pollard, “Current Euthanasia Law in the Netherlands,” Catholic Education Resource Center (2003), catholiceducation.org/en/controversy/euthanasia-and-assisted-suicide/current-euthanasia-law-in-the-netherlands.html. Gorsuch counts the much-celebrated 1984 assisted suicide that resulted in the Dutch Supreme Court siding with the physician on the grounds of “conflicting
duties.” Despite the nominally illegal nature of physician-assisted suicide in the Netherlands, the court found that the killing was justified by the doctor’s professional judgment about the quality
of his patient’s life. Neil M. Gorsuch, The Future of Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 104–105. This legal protection expanded considerably in 1994
when “the Dutch Supreme Court held that, for a request for assisted suicide or euthanasia be justified on ‘necessity’ grounds, the patient’s suffering need not be physical, the patient need not
be terminally ill, and purely psychological suffering can qualify a patient for an act of euthanasia,” 105.
75
76
On this, see Ian Dowbiggin, A Merciful End: The Euthanasia Movement in Modern America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 169.
77
Gorsuch summarizes the law as permitting assisted suicide and euthanasia when the physician: “1. holds the conviction that the request by the patient was voluntary and well-considered, 2.
holds the conviction that the patient’s suffering was lasting and unbearable, 3. has informed the patient about the situation he was in and about his prospects, 4. and the patient [held] the conviction that there was no other reasonable solution for the situation he was in, 5. has consulted at least one other, independent physician who has seen the patient and has given his written opinion
on the requirements of due care, referred to in parts 1–4, and, 6. has terminated a life or assisted in a suicide with due care,” The Future of Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia, 106.
Gorsuch devotes a major portion of Chapter 7 (103–116) to a thorough discussion of the Dutch experience with assisted suicide and euthanasia, including a critical review of major studies.
He observes that “the Surveys have consistently found that a significant proportion of assisted suicides and acts of euthanasia go unreported, even though Dutch professional and legal guidelines
allow the practices and expressly require them to be reported to public authorities,” The Future of Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia, 113.
78
79
See “A Critical Look at the Rising Euthanasia Rates in the Netherlands,” as reported by healthcare-in-europe.com (Jan. 15, 2021), https://healthcare-in-europe.com/en/news/a-critical-look-at-therising-euthanasia-rates-in-the-netherlands.html.
80
Medicare in the United States, for instance, does not provide for “custodial care” in nursing homes and senior living communities. Some family members have objected to depleting their loved
one’s financial resources on “useless” care. In order to qualify for the government aid that may be available, some families enter into convoluted legal mechanisms for shielding assets. An entire
specialty of law focuses on means to transfer assets into legal instruments that make a frail senior appear to be penniless and in need of government-provided nursing home care.
81
Consider the arguments Meilaender makes regarding this in Bioethics: A Primer for Christians, 75–80.
82
Gilbert Meilaender, Bioethics and the Character of Human Life: Essays and Reflections (Eugene, Ore.: Cascade Books, 2020), 121–132.
83
Meilaender, Bioethics and the Character of Human Life, 123. It is important to note that Meilaender refers to “ultimate authority” and is not speaking against something such as a health POA.
13
14
M E D I C A L - E T H I C A L C O N S I D E R AT I O N S
M E D I C A L - E T H I C A L C O N S I D E R AT I O N S
ings and of conversations that take place. “Patients are not blind. They see the offering or non-offering of appropriate food
and fluids as an expression of love and concern or lack of love and concern.”87 Tube feeding should never be deemed useless
or futile if it sustains life and prevents death by starvation or dehydration.88 Since a patient’s life is God-given, we will not
deem a treatment futile that sustains the life, “even though we might all agree this is not the life anyone would choose
for himself.”89
III. Medical-Ethical Considerations
The Commission recognizes that a host of medical and ethical matters come to bear as we face the end of earthly life for
ourselves or our loved ones. Many of the issues have to do with making decisions about treatment — what sort, how long,
how do we decide and so forth. The following are some of the matters that must often be considered. What about matters
such as the use of devices to help with breathing or procedures that provide hydration and nutrition? Is there sometimes an
appropriate time to stop the use of such artificial means for prolonging a physical life? And who should make such decisions — patients, their family, doctors? Are advance directives advisable? Are they absolute?
There are many such questions. The items below seek to address some of them, in no particular order of priority or
logical progression.
A. Ventilators and Medical Prolongation of Life and Dying
Elizabeth R. Skoglund observes, “If a respirator or ventilator can be a bridge back to life, then we have the obligation to try
it. If, on the other hand, the respirator is used when death is inevitable, simply to slow the dying process, then it is wrongfully keeping us from being released to be with God.”84
Do Not Resuscitate (DNR) orders often involve the issue of ventilators. A DNR designation refers to a medical order
making clear an individual’s request that no measures be taken to resuscitate him if his heart or breathing stops. The order
is made while the individual is mentally capable and conscious, or by his health care proxy if he is not. DNR covers a wide
range of specific instructions to health care providers. Some patients may choose to have “full code” with intubation and
to be placed on a ventilator (short or long term). Another patient may decide not to be on a ventilator with a “DNR Select”
code status, where the heart would be shocked if it stops but intubation/ventilation is not performed. Some in this category
choose to permit use of a BIPAP (similar to a CPAP for sleep apnea) to assist with breathing. A third option involves a
patient that chooses to have a status of Do Not Resuscitate (DNR). Various treatments (e.g., antibiotics, tube feeding) and
other care preferences can be specified on some DNR forms in some jurisdictions to guide health team members.
As for medically assisted nutrition and hydration, Luther’s words are on point when he reminds us in the Small
Catechism that “we should fear and love God so that we do not hurt or harm our neighbor in his body, but help and
support him in every physical need.”85 He expands on this in the Large Catechism by explaining “this commandment is
violated not only when we do evil, but also when we have the opportunity to do good to our neighbors and to prevent,
protect, and save them from suffering bodily harm or injury but fail to do so. … If you see anyone who is suffering from
hunger and do not feed her, you have let her starve.”86 Even in a state of coma, patients are often aware of their surround84
Bartlett and Rehder, “Ventilators, Feeding Tubes, and Other End-of-Life Questions,” 2.
85
Luther’s Small Catechism with Explanation, 14.
Kirsi I. Stjerna, “The Large Catechism of Dr. Martin Luther,” in Word and Faith, ed. Hans J. Hillerbrand, Kirsi I. Stjerna and Timothy J. Wengert, vol. 2, The Annotated Luther (Minneapolis:
Fortress Press, 2015), 329.
86
15
2026 Convention Workbook
The concern that oral tube feeding runs the risk of infection or that it may even lead to incidental aspiration that may
result in pneumonia hardly stands up to scrutiny. If one method of delivering nutrition and hydration proves problematic,
there are other means to do it. The so-called “G-tube,” for instance, provides a long-term alternative to the short-term nasogastric delivery of nutrition and hydration following a minor surgical procedure. Placement of a G-tube can be performed
in three ways: surgically through making small incisions guided by a laparoscope, surgically by means of an open incision
to the abdomen, or endoscopically employing a scope into the stomach to create the stoma from the inside.
One might reasonably ask if ever removing artificial nutrition and hydration represents a permissible act. Here the
question revolves around whether one is “allowing a person to die” or is intending to cause death. This paper affirms the
principle that withholding or withdrawing treatments may be done when it becomes useless or excessively burdensome.
In many end-of-life situations, the continued administration of hydration and nutrition may create rather than ameliorate
problems.90 For instance, if the kidneys no longer process fluids for elimination, adding fluids artificially may result in
painful edema (swelling). Yet, we are reminded that the burdensomeness is that of the treatment, not of life itself. We are
called to care for other persons and do all that we can reasonably do to assist in sustaining their lives. Certainly, fulfilling
the commandment not to kill, but to “fear and love God so that we do not hurt or harm our neighbor in his body, but help
and support him in every physical need” ordinarily includes supplying food and water.91
Another question involves comatose patients. Are we morally obligated to sustain their lives by means of artificial
nutrition and hydration when the very fact of being in a persistent vegetative state makes any return to normal life highly
unlikely? But, even here, the annals of medical science are replete with examples of remarkable, even miraculous, recoveries from an unconscious or persistent vegetative state. For instance, Munira Abdulla (born 1959), an Emirati woman,
lapsed into a coma following a car accident and regained consciousness after 27 years.92 While for a conscious patient, the
use of tube feeding may prove terrifying and lead to a state of extreme agitation, an unconscious person would (obviously)
not experience treatment as excessively burdensome. This illustrates the distinction between a treatment imposing an excessive burden and family members wishing to be relieved of the burden of sustaining a person’s life. Meilaender correctly
notes that such care cannot be described as “useless, since it preserves the life of the embodied human being (who is not a
dying patient).”93 To withdraw or withhold nutrition and hydration from a person means certain death. Regardless of our
professed motives, we would be aiming at the death of the person. For this reason, sensitive ethicists such as Meilaender
conclude: “For the permanently unconscious person, feeding is neither useless nor excessively burdensome. It is ordinary
87
Bartlett and Rehder, “Ventilators, Feeding Tubes, and Other End-of-Life Questions,” 3.
88
Bartlett and Rehder, “Ventilators, Feeding Tubes, and Other End-of-Life Questions,” 3.
89
Richard Eyer, Holy People, Holy Lives (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 2014), Kindle Edition, locations 1202–1203.
For a thorough discussion of the morality of withholding food and water, cf. Joanne Lynn and James F. Childress, “Must Patients Always Be Given Food and Water?” in By No Extraordinary
Means, ed. Joanne Lynn (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 47–60. “The question is whether the obligation to act in the patient’s best interests was discharged by withholding or
withdrawing particular medical treatments. All we have claimed is that nutrition and hydration by medical means need not always be provided,” 59. In the same book, Daniel Callahan frets that
mounting social and economic pressures will precipitate “prematurely terminating nutrition” rather than providing it for too long after it becomes burdensome. Callahan, “Public Policy and the
Cessation of Nutrition,” 65. Childress follows Callahan’s chapter and cautions against self-deception. He argues that we should make these decisions with clear-eyed awareness, accepting moral
responsibility for the lines we draw and limits we set. Childress, “What is Morally Justifiable to Discontinue Medical Nutrition and Hydration?” 67–83.
90
91
See CTCR, Christian Care at Life’s End, for further discussion of these kinds of difficult and challenging decisions.
92
“UAE Woman Munira Abdulla Wakes Up After 27 Years in a Coma,” BBC News Service, April 23, 2019, bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-48020481.
93
Gilbert Meilaender, “On Removing Food and Water: Against the Stream,” The Hastings Center Report 14, no. 6 (December 1984), 13.
16