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LCMS Convention Workbook St. Louis, Missouri — 2026, Page 190

Scan: The Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod
Transcription machine transcription, uncorrected

OFFICER, BOARD, AND COMMISSION REPORTS

190

incompleteness of the prerequisite material does not give him the
right to withdraw or void his concurrence and proceed to take up
the now-precluded appeal for action.
Second: That, the concurrence feature of Bylaw 2.14.4.2 having
been added as “a mechanism to help district and Synod presidents
to speak ‘with one voice’ in potentially contested declinations to
suspend” (Secretary Memo), its purpose would be frustrated if such
concurrence, once granted, did not terminate the matter at hand.
The concurrence mechanism brings a matter, so far as it extends,
before the ultimate sitting authority responsible for the doctrinal
and practical unity of the Synod, namely the President, and gives
him a stated window in which to act (or not) upon such facts as are
presented to him. This preserves the right of the accused to timely process, while allowing the President either to “speak with one
voice” together with a district president in dismissing a matter or—
should he have any doubts about concurring—the right at the time
to preserve the ability of an accuser to appeal for action.
Third: That the onus of “the supervision regarding the doctrine and
the administration” and the responsibilities to “conscientiously use
all the means at [the President’s] command to promote and maintain unity of doctrine and practice in all the districts of the Synod”
(Const. Art. XI B 1–3) rests here, as elsewhere, on the President.
These are duties he is expected to perform in good faith, upon
which good faith the Synod ultimately relies. His concurrence concludes with finality the process initiated by the formal written accusation presented to him. The President is the ultimate determiner of
whether the requirements of Bylaw 2.14.4.2, upon which his concurrence is contingent, have been carried out, and the time for him
to make that determination—as regards the process for potential
expulsion of the accused—is before he would grant concurrence in
the disposition of that process. There is no mechanism provided in
the Bylaws for independent or latter-day review of the sufficiency
of materials provided to the President under Bylaw 2.14.4.2, much
less, of the extent or quality of his review of those materials. The
district president and President must be accountable for the conduct
of their offices, but that is a matter outside the particular Bylaw
section 2.14 process and with no impact on it.
Question 2:

Does the complainant have the right to request and
receive confirmation or evidence that the President
of the Synod received and reviewed the full written
charges and the record of the district president’s investigation, as required by Bylaw 2.14.4.2, prior to
concurring under Bylaw 2.14.4.2 (a)?

Opinion: See above as to “and reviewed.” There is no standard or
finder of fact for latter-day review of this aspect. As to “received,”
neither the Bylaws of the Synod nor the relevant SOPM establish
such a right. The concurrence of the President of the Synod under
Bylaw 2.14.4.2 necessarily includes the implicit certification that,
in the determination of the Synod’s ultimate ecclesiastical supervisory officer, the procedure stated has been followed in good faith,
including the provision of all required materials. The President
could explore doubts in this regard as part of his ecclesiastical supervision of the district presidents, but the complainant has no such
independent right.
The Bylaws do not preclude an accuser from inquiring of the accused’s district president whether the entire formal written statement of the matter was conveyed to the President, or of the President, whether such was received or how it was reviewed. At the
same time, the Bylaws do not establish a right to a response.
2026 Convention Workbook

Question 3:

If the required procedure of Bylaw 2.14.4.2 was not
properly followed, does that procedural failure invalidate the President’s concurrence under Bylaw
2.14.4.2 (a), thus restoring the complainant’s right
of appeal for action?

Opinion: With regard to the completeness of the record presented
to the President or the adequacy of his review, the situation here
presented, the question has been answered above. The President’s
concurrence, once given in response to a clear request, is finally
dispositive of the matter as presented in the formal, written accusation.

Reconsideration of Op. 24-3031, Adjunct Seminary
Faculty (24-3031A)
Minutes of February 6–7, 2026
By an email and memorandum of May 6, 2025, the presidents
of Concordia Theological Seminary, Fort Wayne, and Concordia
Seminary, St. Louis, requested that the commission reconsider its
Opinion 24-3031, Adjunct Seminary Faculty, which can be found
in the minutes of March 21–22, 2025. The commission accepted
the request and solicited input, under Bylaw 3.9.2.2 (b), from the
boards of regents and presidents of the seminaries and universities
of the Synod, as well as from Concordia University System and
the President of the Synod, some of which (and some members of
which) responded with written materials.
Two concerns are expressed in the request to reconsider Op. 243031:
1.

That Bylaw 3.10.5.5 (g) should be considered as applicable
to full-time faculty only, not, as the opinion states, to all
faculty (part-time and/or temporary included).

2.

That the term “staff” used in Bylaw section 3.11 should not
be considered, as the opinion states, as applicable to “faculty” (including part-time or temporary).

Opinion: As to the first concern, the request for reconsideration
cites several bylaws in which the unqualified word faculty must be
meant to refer only to full-time faculty, in some cases because only
the full-time faculty vote and some action of the faculty is being
referred to. The fact that they do not vote (or do not tend to receive
sabbaticals), however, does not place the part-time faculty outside
the faculty, as Bylaw 3.10.5.7 makes clear. In fact, Bylaw 3.10.5.7
must limit which faculty can vote precisely because the part-time
and temporary faculty are faculty. The commission finds no reason
in the bylaws cited to conclude that Bylaw 3.10.5.5 (g)’s use of the
term faculty can, on the basis of the bylaw language, be determined
to refer only to full-time faculty.
While the commission recognizes that understanding the reference
to “the appointment of faculty members” in Bylaw 3.10.5.5 (g) to
apply beyond the full-time faculty runs counter to now-common
practice, the commission stands by its interpretation of the bylaw
as stated in the original opinion. The commission further restates
that because the primary purpose of each seminary is to teach and
train those going into the ministry, the involvement of the boards of
regents in the appointment of all those carrying out that education
would seem to be their “fulfilling of the mission of the seminary”
(Bylaw 3.10.5.1).
As to the second concern, the commission finds that the term “staff”
is used in a wider sense in Bylaw section 3.11, as opposed to the
narrower sense used in contradistinction to faculty in, for example,