LCMS Convention Workbook St. Louis, Missouri — 2026, Page 189

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OFFICER, BOARD, AND COMMISSION REPORTS
The constitutional right and duty to “promote and maintain unity of
doctrine and practice in all the districts of the Synod” upon which
the appeal for action is founded is the President’s (Const. Art. XI
B 3; Op. 16-2791; 2016 Res. 12-14) and not the accuser’s. Where
the President has concurred in a district president’s decision not to
suspend, he has finally exercised, with regard to the matter at hand,
his right and duty to intervene in the matter to “promote and maintain unity of doctrine and practice in all the districts of the Synod.”
The concurrence mechanism of Bylaw 2.14.4.2 does not in essence
prevent a matter from coming before the President of the Synod for
review; it simply advances the President’s review of, and potential
concurrence in dismissal of, a matter that might otherwise subsequently come before him as an appeal for action.
Prerequisite to obtaining such concurrence, the district president is
to “convey [] to [the President of the Synod] the accuser’s formal
written accusation, the record of [the district president’s] investigation, and [the district president’s] preliminary determination” (Bylaw 2.14.4.2). It is the clear expectation of the bylaw that these items
be conveyed fully, and to this the district president is duty bound
(see also clear standards for what is to be included in the “record of
the investigation,” SOPM for Bylaw section 2.14, December 2023,
Flow Chart Detail, Step 2.3, pp. 31–32). It must be said, at least in
passing, that a district president’s withholding of required information from the President to obtain a concurrence and frustrate a
potentially valid appeal for action would be a “violat[ion] … of the
requirements or procedures” as described in Bylaw 2.14.10.2, with
potential for the consequences there also described.
It must also be said that the President must be aware he is granting
a concurrence for him to have been said to have done so. Bylaw
2.14.4.2 requires certain materials to be presented to the President
within the framework of a formal request for concurrence in a matter involving doctrine and practice and a formal, written accusation.
Clearly, if the President is not aware he is granting such concurrence (for example, if a district president in a conversation describes a situation without providing a formal, written accusation,
and the President casually indicates approval of the district president’s approach or conclusions), no such concurrence is granted. As
the question is presented, however, there is no question of whether
the President understood that he would be granting, and did grant,
a concurrence upon materials presented to him that at least facially
met the requirements of Bylaw 2.14.4.2.
We now turn to the question at hand, which is of what options an
accuser has if, after a concurrence has been delivered, he believes
the “accuser’s formal, written accusation, the record of [the district president’s] investigation, and[/or] [the district president’s]
determination” were not fully delivered to the President, or fully
reviewed by him.
We deal with the latter part first. The question in its second aspect
asks whether a failure of the President to review the record in full
invalidates the concurrence. This, the dignity of the President’s office presumes (see “Third” below) but the bylaws do not clearly
require, or present a definite standard for review of such, or provide
a finder of fact to reach such a determination. This being the case,
the commission has no authority to set a standard or provide a finder of fact regarding this aspect, and it will therefore not be further
considered in this opinion.
Now to the first part, as to the full conveyance of the required material to the President. The President’s concurrence is a finally dispositive act as regards the facts presented in the formal, written
accusation. Of it there is no means of review provided, and from

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it there is no further appeal. It has the full effect of a presidential
determination not to initiate formal proceedings upon an appeal for
action, just delivered earlier in the process.
Specifically, the Bylaws provide for no latter-day review of the adequacy of the material presented to the President that could void his
concurrence and restore his ability to receive an appeal for action
in the matter at hand. Bylaw section 2.14 in other places provides
explicit opportunities for review of procedural adherence, as well
as specific remedies. For processes that reach a panel (constituted
only when a member has been suspended), the panel is empowered
to consider compliance with the bylaw provisions; indeed, one of
the sub-issues each panel decides is: “Was proper procedure followed by the ecclesiastical supervisor in suspending the member
of the Synod (Const. Art. XIII 2; Bylaws 2.14.3–2.14.10.3)?” (id.,
Decision, p. 57). There is a procedure for objections to alleged noncompliance—when a matter is before a panel—that can result in
corrective action and even a new panel (id., General Regulation V,
p. 18). But the Bylaws of the Synod provide no authority—prior
to an empanelment—to review the actions of ecclesiastical supervisors (other than that they so empower the President, Const. Art.
XI B 1–2; Bylaw 3.3.1.1.1 [b, d]; 3.3.1.2 [b–c]) and grant no authority—not even to the President—to compel performance or to
correct, outside established bylaw procedures and timelines, prior
actions or failures to act. Here, the appeal for action and its attendant prior concurrence are themselves instances of established
bylaw procedures allowing the President to intervene upon the performance of duties by the initial ecclesiastical supervisor; bylaws
provide no further authority to—or means whereby any might—intervene upon the intervention, especially after the fact.
When the President’s concurrence is officially requested under the
provision in question, the President must determine, therefore, before he concurs, whether he is entirely satisfied with the adequacy
of the record before him to allow his determination that there is no
cause that the worker should be suspended, or further admonished
under possibility of suspension, on the basis of the facts presented
in the formal, written accusation. In case of any doubt in the President’s mind as to the completeness of the record before him that
cannot be resolved by conference with the district president, he has
the options either to not concur, which may prompt the district president to revise his determination or initiate further investigation, for
which more time can be allotted, or to take no action, allowing the
district president to proceed with his own determination (id., Step
2.5, p. 32). These options both preserve the potential for appeal for
action to the President and for his subsequent independent investigation of the charges and his admonition and/or suspension of the
accused (id., Step 2.6, p. 33).
In summary, the commission finds:
First: That a presidential concurrence once clearly given in response
to a clear request under Bylaw 2.14.4.2 cannot be voided, so as to
restore the possibility of appeal for action. The Bylaws provide no
specific mechanism for an appeal for action to be revived following a presidential concurrence under Bylaw 2.14.4.2. “Expulsion
shall be executed only after following such procedure as shall be
set forth in the Bylaws of the Synod” (Const. Art. XIII 2). Where
the bylaws and attendant SOPM do not themselves provide means
of procedural correction, the ability to correct procedural errors is
severely curtailed. Where a concurrence is requested, the onus is
on the Synod President to ensure that any doubt about sufficiency
of the material before him is resolved before he grants any such
concurrence. Once he has concurred, a subsequent discovery of the
2026 Convention Workbook