Collection › LCMS Convention Workbook (St. Louis, Missouri) › 1969 · 48th Convention › Sheet 552
LCMS Convention Workbook St. Louis, Missouri — 1969, Sheet 552

Scan: The Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod
Transcription machine transcription, uncorrected

WOMAN SUFFRAGE IN THE CHURCH 521

IV. Some Practical Observations

Of special interest at the moment is the passage
from First Timothy with its reference to silence in the
church on the part of women lest they lord it over men.
This text got into the discussion on woman suffrage on
the principle that there is a connection between the
franchise and church office as ways of exercising au-
thority. This was the view of the New York convention
in 1967 when it passed its resolution declaring “women
to be eligible to serve as advisory members on synodical
boards, commissions, and committees within the frame-
work of Scriptural principles.”

We must observe in this connection that the New
Testament is not very explicit on the issues of voting.
While the word that can be translated as “voting”
(cheirotoneo — stretching the hand) occurs twice (Acts
14:27; 2 Cor. 8:19), it is not clear whether the term is
actually to be so understood. The Bauer-Arndt-Ging-
rich Lexicon suggests that 2Cor.8:19 describes the
churches as choosing a representative to accompany
Paul on his journey to take the collection to Jerusalem.
However, nothing is said here as to the method by which
such a choice was made. Furthermore, the reference is
less to an office in the church than to a mission of a
number of congregations.

In the other passage, Acts 14:23, the word appears to
mean “appoint.” There it is said that Paul and Barnabas
appointed elders congregation by congregation. In other
words, no kind of franchise seems to have been involved
in filling these offices.

Some kind of group action was involved in the
appointment of the Seven in Acts6:3. But the word
for voting does not occur there. The disciples are di-
rected to select some men; but the word used (episkep-
testhai) signifies “examining” or “inspecting” rather than
“voting.” Under any circumstances, nothing is said
about the way in which this was to be done.

When the church in Antioch was instructed to set
aside Saul and Barnabas for the task of missionary ex-
pansion, nothing is said about voting. The members of
the church are there described as being at worship, fast-
ing and praying (Acts 13:2-3) when these two men
were designated by an action of the Holy Spirit and or-
dained for their work by the congregation.

All of these considerations suggest that the matter of
the franchise as it relates to the participation of women
is not sharply delineated in the New Testament. Since
no doctrinal point can be established except on the
basis of a clear passage, the church cannot, on the basis
of the texts discussed, adopt any binding regulations
on these matters.

With these various points in mind, we need to re-
turn to the issue of voting in a meeting of the congre-
gation. Does such an exercise of the franchise consti-
tute an act of domination over someone else, especially
over cne’s husband?

Suffrage is defined by The Oxford English Dictionary
as “a vote given by a member of a body, state, or so-

ciety, in assent to a proposition or in favour of the elec-
tion of a person; in extended sense, a vote for or against
any controverted question or nomination”; also, “the
right or privilege of voting as a member of a body,
state, etc.”

Other dictionaries of the English language define
suffrage in essentially the same manner. Common ex-
perience in a democratic society gives abundant evi-
dence that this definition is correct.

From the definition of suffrage it is evident that pub-
lic teaching in the church is not an essential or neces-
sary part of suffrage in the church. The adult male
members of the church who now enjoy the right of
suffrage and of holding office are not thereby em-
powered to fill the pastoral office, which includes the
responsibility of teaching publicly in the church. This
right and privilege is for those who are called for this
task by the church itself. Cp. Augsburg Confession,
Art. XIV.

It is also evident from the definition of the franchise
that it does not give to those who have the right of
suffrage the power to lord it over others. On the con-
trary, the right of suffrage is given in order to prevent
individuals or small groups from usurping authority
over others.

In the matter of suffrage, then, we must conclude
that there is nothing in Scripture to prohibit women
from exercising the franchise in the voters’ meetings of
the congregations to which they belong. In such assem-
blies they are in no stronger position than anyone else
to turn the franchise into an instrument of usurpation.
The parliamentary procedures normally followed in such
meetings are designed for the express purpose of pre-
venting the concentration of power with a view to dom-
ination. The temptation to abuse power, of course, is
always present. The Scripture passages we have ex-
amined contain the extra caution to women that they
are not to use their positions of responsibility and ser-
vice as instruments for lording it over men.

When it comes to the matter of holding office in
church, the Detroit convention already resolved that
women are not to hold any such offices in the congre-
gation as directly involve women in “the public admin-
istration of the Office of the Keys,” (Proceedings, p. 103;
Res. 2-36). This stricture would apply specifically to the
pastoral office and membership on the board of elders.
To this point we would need to add the observation that
some offices in the congregation implicitly expect the ex-
ercise of authority over others, including men. Holding
such offices might indeed be in violation of what has
been called the order of creation or of preservation.

There are other kinds of offices, however; and in that
sphere many of the principles are applicable which were
set forth in the discussion of the franchise. Whether an
individual is either appointed or elected to such an office
in Synod or in the congregation is incidental. The
method by which one is given office is not of the essence.
The basic question remains: Does such office-holding, of
itself, constitute an act of lording it over others?