LCMS Convention Workbook St. Louis, Missouri — 2004, Page 196

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196 . THEOLOGY AND CHURCH RELATIONS

cal supervisors with enormous authority. These officials can now
be expected to buttress their decisions by first seeking (and docu-
menting) input from other authorities. Yet our Synod’s ongoing ef-
fectiveness requires that pastors, Circuit counselors, and District
Presidents assert and demonstrate their own competence and con-
fidence to render theological judgments independently, without re-
sorting to the CTCR.

In its 1987 Report on Divorce and. Remarriage, the CTCR
quoted its own 1981 Report on Hwman Sexuality. The statement re-
peated there bears repeating here (emphasis added):

The divorce of Christian pastors must be taken with utmost serious-
ness. It is difficult to see how the church can maintain the integrity of its
witness—especially in an age where divorce is prevalent—if it permits
pastors who have divorced their wives for less than biblical reasons to
continue in the office of the public ministry. Generally a pastor who has
been divorced, except in cases of unchastity or desertion on the part of
his wife, ought not to remain in office nor be reinstated in the office of
pastor. However, it is possible that under very exceptional circum-
stances a former pastor may by the grace of God come to the point of
being in a position to be reconsidered as a person to be entrusted once
more with the powers of the pastoral office. (p. 44; underlining added)
This general rule for pastors has been applied to other Synod-

rostered church workers as well: If divorced, he or she generally
ought not remain in office.

The CTCR enters dangerous territory when its Opinions be-
come embroiled in “circumstances” and the determination of par-
ticular exceptions. The effective exercise of pastoral judgment and
ecclesiastical supervision require strict confidentiality with regard
to the details necessary to make such determinations. These can-
not be adequately communicated to the CTCR. Furthermore, the
Commission itself could never account to the Synod for its judg-
ments regarding “very exceptional circumstances” without a
lengthy explanation. Substantive guidance on weighty matters of
casuistry is difficult to provide in one or two pages. Engaging the
CTCR in such casuistry cannot fail to contribute to further central-
ization of the Synod’s ecclesiastical supervision. This will tend to
completely overwhelm its administrative procedures. In this case,
the Commission simply does not (and should not) have access to all
of the relevant details that would enable it to provide a carefully
reasoned Opinion.

Now that the CTCR has rendered an Opinion on this matter, the
status of CTCR documents in the Synod becomes a matter of even
greater concern. Some will treat the public record of this Opinion
as a precedential “ruling” that can (and will) be applied to other
cases. For these reasons alone, the Synod ought not endorse this
Opinion by “accepting” or “commending” it. |

Beyond these procedural concerns, the Synod should not en-
dorse the substance of the Commission’s response to this question.

- In the fifth Summary Statement on pages 38-39 of the CTCR’s
1987 Report Divorce and Remarriage, the Commission seems to
have legitimized an ungodly interpretation of 1 Corinthians 7 and
the term “malicious desertion,” thereby permitting or approving
what God would have us:refuse and condemn.’ The very fact that
this question has come before the Commission stands as evidence.
My intent for the remainder of this Opinion is to stimulate a re-
assessment of this term in the context of this passage of Scripture.

Only one passage of Scripture was cited by the Commission’s
Opinion on “malicious desertion”: 1 Cor. 7:4-7. Actually, this text
requires a husband and wife to fulfill their “duty” to one another,
and not to “deprive” one another. The more relevant text for “mali-
cious desertion” comes later in this same chapter, in verses 12-16.
The Commission did not properly explain the distinction and con-
nection between these texts (14 pages are hardly adequate to do so).

In the Concordia Commentary on 1 Corinthians, the Rev. Dr.
Gregory J. Lockwood explains, “There is a close connection be-
tween Paul’s warnings and commands about sexual immorality in
chapters 5 and 6 and his positive efforts in chapter 7 to:form
healthy attitudes toward marriage and sex.” Verses 4—7 of chapter 7
must be understood in this context. Before engaging the definition
of “malicious desertion” and the question of its sufficiency to jus-
tify divorce among Christians, God’s words about marriage and di-
vorce must first be understood.

Lockwood translates 1 Cor. 7:10-11 as follows:

To the married I command—not I, but the Lord—that a wife must
not separate from her husband. But if she separates, she must remain
unmarried or be reconciled to her husband. And a husband must not di-
vorce his wife.

Elsewhere, he explains the mandatory force of the original Greek:

Throughout chapter 7, when Paul is giving an authoritative and per-
manent directive for the church, this commentary will rendér the third
person imperatives with the word “must,” as in 7:3, “The husband must
give his wife-her marital due.” Similarly, most of the third person im-
peratives negated with pm are also translated with “must,” as in 7:12-13,
“He must not divorce her. . .. She must not divorce her husband.” The
reason for this translation practice is that the force of the Greek is
stronger than is reflected in the common English renderings with “let,”
as in the KJV, “Ler the husband render unto the wife due benevolence”
(7:3), and “Let him not put her away. . Let her not leave him”
(7:12-13).

In Greek Grammar beyond the Basics, Wallace explains: “The third
person imperative is normally translated Let him do, etc. This is easily
confused in English with a permissive idea. Its force is more akin to he
must, however, or periphrastically, J command him to .. .” In a foot-
note, Wallace continues, “The Greek is stronger than a mere e option, en-
gaging the volition and placing a requirement on the individual.” Re-
‘garding the negated third person imperative, Wallace comments, 4
English this (transtation with ‘let’] looks as if the author is saying, ‘I
‘don’t permit . . .’ But the Greek is stronger; it is as if he is saying, ‘I
order...””

Some of the other constructions, such as the infinitives in 7:10—-11,
are also translated with “must” because they are part of authoritative
commands.’

Then Lockwood goes on to explain the meaning of these verses as
follows:

Paul now tums to married people in situations where both partners are
Christians. He states categorically that they are not to divorce, His author-
ity for this muling is not his own, although elsewhere he will express his

-counsel as a faithful apostle (e.g. 7: 25, 40). Rather, in ms case Paul has a

word fr Lo dJ lf T-

idden divorce the Creator’ 5 thus putting

himself at odds with the liberal views of Rabbi Hillel and his followers,
and with the prevailing ethos in Greco-Roman society. . . .

However, if the unthinkable happens and the wife in fact leaves, she
should not seek a new husband. Only two options are open to her as a
Christian: to remain unmarried or be reconciled to her husband. This
apostolic word reflects the NT view that marriage is indissoluble: the :

come one flesh wil] always remain

dissolve a marriage (Rom 7:2; 1 Cor 7:39).6 As one 0 Only death op
serves, “Divorcing on use to another is nothing other than a
legalized form of adultery.” Note how in both 7:10 and 7:11 the weight
falls on what in Greek is the final clause: “a wife from her husband must
not separate” (7:10) and “a husband his wife must not divorce” (7:11).
The Scriptures take a stern and uncompromising stand against divorce;
“T hate divorce,’ says the Lord” (Mal 2:16).

Finally Paul adds that a husband must not divorce (literally “send
away”) his wife (1 Cor 7:11). Although men had this legal prerogative
both in Jewish and Greco-Roman society, the apostle does not take his
standards from the culture but from the Lord.’ (Underlined emphasis
added)

With regard to the question put to the CTCR, 1 Cor. 7:4~7 certainly
has relevance:

But because of immoralities, let each man have his own wife, and
let each woman have her own husband. Let the husband fulfill his duty
to his wife, and likewise also the wife to her husband. The wife does
not have authority over her own body, but the husband does; and like-
wise also the husband does not have authority over his own body, but
the wife does. Stop depriving one another, except by agreement for a
time that you may devote yourselves to prayer, and come together again
lest Satan tempt you because of your lack of self-control. But this I say
by way of concession, not of command. (1 Cor. 7:2-6 NASB)

A spouse who unilaterally refuses to have sexual relations with
his or her mate violates the clear teaching Paul presented and dis-
obeys God. The Greek word ep&ovor0cCet in this text means that
spouses literally “have authority” over each ather’s bodies. Lock-
wood quotes another commentator to note: