LCMS Convention Workbook St. Louis, Missouri — 2016, Page 207

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IV. THEOLOGICAL DOCUMENTS­­—COMMISSION ON THEOLOGY AND CHURCH RELATIONS

specific objects in their immediate environment, the most intelligent animals
still seem to have no concept of nature as a whole. It does not seem plausible
that they have ever entertained the cosmological argument for God—in part
because they have no concept of the cosmos as the totality of physical reality
which they inhabit. Humans are dramatically different, and from before the
time of Aristotle until the present, they have been very interested in cosmology. To be sure, the skeptical philosopher David Hume (1711–1776) poured
scorn on the idea that humans could understand the cosmos:
[E]ven if we do take the operations of one part of nature on
another as our basis for judgment about the origin of the whole
world (which is something we should never do), why would we
select as our basis such a tiny, weak, limited cause as the reason
and design of animals on this planet seems to be? This little agitation of the brain that we call ‘thought’—what special privilege
does it have that entitles it to serve as the model of the whole
universe? 106
However, Christian philosopher Blaise Pascal (1623–1662) anticipated
and exposed a fallacy in Hume’s critique of human capacities:
Through space the universe grasps me and swallows me up like
a speck; through thought I grasp it.107
Hume confuses physical limitations of the human thinker’s body with cognitive limitations of the thinker’s mind. The fact that our thought is correlated
with a “little agitation of the brain” does not prevent us from thinking about
the “whole universe.” It might be noted that Hume himself has to assume we
are capable of doing this in order to make his critique of theistic arguments,
since he attempts to offer alternative explanations of the cosmos. This is why,
of all creatures on earth, only human beings can consider why the universe
came into existence, and ponder the significance of its apparent fine-tuning
for intelligent life. Clearly God has provided humans with sufficiently powerful minds that we can think of the entire creation He entrusted to us.
In this sense we are like God—which is, unfortunately, also the root of
our temptation to reach up and claim to be God. The godlike scope of human
thought can tempt some people, including scientists, to believe that they can
completely understand and control reality by themselves: the lure of Babel
remains strong (Gen. 11:1–9). But Scripture reminds us that although in some
ways our capacity for thought is godlike, we are not God, and our thoughts
can never ascend to His heights.

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For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways
my ways, declares the Lord. For as the heavens are higher than
the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways. (Is. 55:8–9)
As Jastram has argued,108 this means that though humans are like God,
they are called to a “middle road,”109 with a proper balance of confidence
and humility.110 On the one hand, as image-bearers called to steward the rest
of God's earthly creation, we can be confident that we are capable of doing
science well enough to care for the world and to serve our neighbor. But, on
the other hand, our intellectual gifts only enable us to grasp and control the
contingent, temporal order of nature. They do not help us to discern the ultimate reason why things are as they are.
Stewardship is a mandate to care for things below us, a mandate for
those specially made in the image of God to care for all the other living and
non-living creations not so made, and to preserve and develop that trust for
the sake of present and future generations. It is not a mandate to reach above
us and supplant God’s role in providing guidance and salvation. Nor does it
authorize us to treat other people made in the image of God as if they were
merely part of the rest of creation which lacks that image. That is what is fundamentally wrong about seeing another human being merely as a collection
of cells or organs that might be harvested for some other purpose.
The image of God is also reflected in our ability to know the particular
kinds of creature we are called to husband. In the beginning, Adam was
allowed to name the creatures (Gen. 2:19), and it is arguable that these names
were not arbitrary but reflected natural kinds.111 At any rate, scientists have
since developed detailed classificatory schemes for both the living and
non-living environment (e.g., taxonomies into phyla and species and the
periodic table of elements). For example, Carl Linnaeus (1707–1778), revered
as the father of modern biological taxonomy, was the son of a Lutheran pastor,
and his scientific work in botany and zoology was motivated by a profound
belief in the orderliness of God’s creation. Scientists have also used observation and reason to discern regularities and laws that allow the effective
prediction and control of natural events, and the ability to synthesize useful
compounds and develop labor-saving technologies.

108
Nathan Jastram, “Scientists Called to Be Like God,” in ed. Angus Menuge, Reading God’s
World: The Scientific Vocation (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 2004), 243–269.
109
In this context, the phrase is due to Stanley Jaki, The Road of Science and the Ways to God
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 87.

106

David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/
pdfs/hume1779.pdf (Copyright 2010–2015, Jonathan Bennett), Part 2, 13.
107

Blaise Pascal, Pensées, trans. A. J. Krailsheimer (New York: Penguin Books, 1966), #113, 59.

110
Consider the case of a skilled surgeon whose abilities enable him or her to treat successfully
medical crises that would have been impossible a generation ago. Yet, not every operation is
a success.
111
This was Luther’s opinion. For discussion, see Harrison, The Bible, Protestantism, and the Rise
of Natural Science, 249.

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Among all God's earthly creatures, only human beings can know what
nature is and what particular kinds of things are found there, so that these
natural resources can be used to fulfill the so-called “cultural mandate” (Gen
1:28), which allows humans to develop nature into culture to serve their
needs and purposes. However, we are not authorized to do this in just any
way. Stewardship of nature is a trust, not an unrestricted gift. Our stewardship vocation is not a license to ravage and despoil nature. We do not own
it: “The earth is the Lord’s and the fullness thereof, the world and those
who dwell therein” (Ps. 24:1); we are only caretakers, and together with our
intellectual gifts, God also provides the moral capacities required to fulfill
our obligation to be wise stewards. Here it is significant that the Noahic covenant God makes after the flood is made between God, human beings and
“every living creature” (Gen. 9:8–11). Although these other creatures are not
image-bearers and may be used for food (Gen. 9:1–3), still they were created
good (Gen. 1:25) and therefore have intrinsic value, not merely instrumental
value for our purposes. It is unwarranted to damage the non-human environment without need, not only because it harms future generations of people
who depend on it, but because it shows disrespect for the value of a world
God made good.
Here again, it is clear that humans are different from the most intelligent
animals. Since these animals do not conceive of themselves as rational agents
persisting over time, they cannot grasp moral rules that apply to their conduct
over time.112 Humans can understand such rules and hence have stewardship
obligations that no other creature has. It really is up to us to use the world
wisely for the sake of posterity.
As with a theology of nature, a developed theological anthropology can
also find support in independent evidences. While Scripture’s authority is
inherent, it can aid the apologetic task to urge those who reject it to consider
the scientific evidences and philosophical arguments which support our being
made in the image of God. For example, neuroscientist Mario Beauregard and
science journalist Denyse O’Leary have thoroughly exposed the poor science
lying behind attempts to reduce the mind to the brain and to reduce religious
experience to the product of malfunctioning “God spots” in the brain.113 And
eminent philosopher J. P. Moreland provides a rigorous defense of several
characteristics of human beings that evidence their being specially made in
the image of God, including the character of their consciousness, the nature
of rationality, and their access to moral norms.114

112

See Richard Taylor, Ethics, Faith and Reason (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1985), 14.

113
Mario Beauregard and Denyse O’Leary, The Spiritual Brain: A Neuroscientist’s Case for the
Existence of the Soul (New York: HarperCollins, 2007).
114

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8. The theological underpinnings of modern science
We have seen that Christian theology provides a coherent rationale for
doing science, conceived as a stewardship vocation, and that human beings
are equipped to carry out that vocation as those made in the image of God.
At a deeper level, Christian theology also provides the intellectual and moral
foundation for supposing that science is a worthwhile project. It is easy to
imagine that science simply developed as an extension of human curiosity
and that it has little to do with background worldview. To the contrary, as
many scholars have pointed out, most worldviews are not congenial to the
idea that science is a feasible or valuable project.115 As a matter of historical
fact, it was Christian theology that provided the presuppositions that supported the rise of modern science.116

The feasibility of science
The idea that nature can be systematically investigated presupposes that
it makes coherent sense, that there are some overarching rules or laws that
explain its operation. Animism and pantheism discourage this idea because
nature is viewed as a storehouse of local and capricious deities, so there is no
reason to expect general principles or uniformities. By contrast, the Christian
idea that nature is a book inscribed with a logos by a single author encouraged
scientists to believe that there were rationally comprehensible, universal
laws of nature. This understanding of the scientific task was explicit in the
writings of some of the great founders of modern science. Thus Galileo wrote
that science “is written in this grand book, the universe … in the language of
mathematics.”117 Likewise, Johannes Kepler and Robert Boyle saw nature as
a book inscribed with mathematical laws.118 And, as the eminent historian
of science John Hedley Brooke points out, these scientists assumed that the
same logos at work in nature was also reflected in the reason of beings made
in God’s image.119 This encouraged scientists to think that their minds were
sufficiently attuned to the natural world that they could interpret and read
tinuum, 2011) and Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro, A Brief History of the Soul (Malden, MA:
Wiley-Blackwell, 2011).
115
For an excellent comparative analysis of the impact of various worldviews, see Stanley Jaki,
The Savior of Science (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000). He shows how a variety of philosophical
and theological rivals to Christianity lead to stagnation and “still births” that obstruct scientific
progress.
116
See Nancy Pearcey and Charles Thaxton, The Soul of Science: Christian Faith and Natural
Philosophy (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 1994) and many of the essays in Reading God’s World,
ed. Angus Menuge.
117
Galileo Galilei, “The Assayer,” in Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo, trans. Stillman Drake
(New York: Doubleday, 1957), 237f.
118

Harrison, “Priests of the Most High God,” 73–74.

J. P. Moreland, The Recalcitrant Imago Dei (London: SCM Press, 2009). Other excellent works
in this area include Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro, eds., Naturalism (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 2008) and Mark Baker and Stewart Goetz, eds., The Soul Hypothesis (New York: Con-

119
John Hedley Brooke, Science and Religion: Some Historical Perspectives (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 19.

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2016 Convention Workbook