LCMS Convention Workbook St. Louis, Missouri — 2016, Page 163

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IV. THEOLOGICAL DOCUMENTS­­—COMMISSION ON THEOLOGY AND CHURCH RELATIONS

Even in dialogue with those professing themselves to be atheists or agnostics, and so not accepting even of the vague “God-talk” characteristic of civil
religion, one might establish some common ground from which to proclaim
the gospel by initially emphasizing shared left-hand concerns pertaining to
the law. This, for example, was precisely the goal of C.S. Lewis in the popular
work quoted above. Beginning with the fact that all people innately recognize,
embrace, and utilize the simple categories of “right” and “wrong,” he was able
to point out that all people possess at least the concept of moral laws. Further,
despite often noted (but relatively few, and sometimes dubious) exceptions,
there is something approaching universal consensus—across chronological,
geographical, and cultural divides—on what these laws are and what they
require, at least in their fundamental principles.194 This then allows him to
raise the question of what accounts for such a consensus and, therefore, what
accounts for this law itself. His own answer is that the universal nature of
such law suggests its objectivity, that is, its transcending of all particular times,
places, and cultures. By way of analogy with even humanly contrived and
promulgated laws, which originate most immediately from human minds,
Lewis then concludes that the most satisfactory explanation of the origin of
these fundamental moral principles recognized by all human beings is their
being promulgated by a transcendent mind. [See Without Excuse? on the
facing page]
As previously noted, Lewis himself recognizes—and cautions—that a
transcendent mind is “not yet within a hundred miles of the God of Christian
theology.”195 Further, one need not agree with each of Lewis’ points (or, again,
their greatly oversimplified presentation here) in order simply to recognize
that his attempt to establish an awareness of the natural law and, on that
basis, to establish some natural knowledge of a divine being to whom one is
morally indebted, is one potentially practical application of these concepts in
such a way that might prepare one to welcome the proclamation of the gospel.
Finally, though these are only two examples out of any number possible, the
above opportunities suggested by contemporary civil religious discourse and
common moral understandings are perhaps especially noteworthy in this
regard; that is, they proceed directly from certain common concerns regarding
the law, a clear knowledge of which is prerequisite to recognizing the gospel
as the “good news” it is.
However, an emphasis on the natural knowledge of God and the law is
not, of course, the only manner in which one might establish and proceed
from some point of contact to specifically Christian witness. Nor is proceeding
from a natural knowledge of the law and its implications the only manner in
which one might establish even a rudimentary knowledge of God’s existence.
194

Perhaps unsurprisingly, given some of the conclusions noted above, these fundamental
moral principles largely reflect the content of the Decalogue. On this point, see also Lewis’
treatment of the subject in his Abolition of Man (New York: Macmillan, 1947).
195

Lewis, Mere Christianity, 25.

Without Excuse?
Though retired neighbors Thomas and Henry do
not see eye to eye on questions of religion—and, in
fact, regularly argue about it—both share an interest in history, and so often spend evenings together
watching documentaries on a cable history channel. One night, while viewing a program on the
Nuremberg trials of Nazi war criminals following the
Second World War, Thomas was struck by the legal
conundrum faced by the judges and prosecutors
at Nuremberg. While the evidence of atrocities
was overwhelming, and clearly implicated those
standing trial, the defense quite rightly argued that
the crimes of which the defendants were accused
were not in fact “crimes” at all; that is, they had not
been illegal under the judicial codes of the Third
Reich. Their actions may indeed have transgressed
the laws of the United States, or France, or Great
Britain; but, being German citizens, it was argued,
the defendants could neither be tried by the laws
of another nation, nor by ex post facto laws. Thomas
was sympathetic to the clear logic of this argument—and yet simultaneously disturbed by the
implication that such inhumane acts as committed
by the Nazis might be deemed legitimate simply
because they were not explicitly proscribed in a
written legal code. He was therefore intrigued by

what the documentary described as the prosecutors’ appeal to a “natural law,” a law which, even if
not enshrined in the written code of a particular
nation, is sufficiently evident to and binding upon
all rational human beings. By the light of this law,
the prosecutors argued, those standing trial could
have—and should have—clearly recognized the
wrong of their actions, that their actions were, as
the indictment described them, “crimes against
humanity.” Thus, the lack of specific prohibitions in
the positive law of Germany did not excuse their
behavior. As the documentary concluded, Thomas
found himself also sympathetic to the logic of this
argument. Again, though, he was faintly disturbed
by its possible implications. If right and wrong,
justice and injustice, were not simply defined by the
“social contract” of a particular people in a particular
place at a particular time, but were in some respect
objective and universal categories, then what possibly accounted for the existence of such an objective
and universal law? What—or who—could be considered its author? While the credits rolled, he began
to suspect that Henry might well win their next
religious argument, and that he might have to begin
rethinking his doubt of God’s existence.

As noted in previous sections, for example, Luther, the Lutheran dogmaticians, and the Scriptures themselves hold that some acquired knowledge of
God is made possible by God’s gift of reason being applied to the evidence
of the natural world in which he faintly yet sufficiently reveals himself. Thus,
especially when reflecting upon the first chapter of Romans, Luther frequently
remarks that, even among unbelievers, “their reason tells them that the
heavenly bodies cannot run their definite course without a ruler.”196 Likewise,
the dogmaticians regularly confess that God might be known, even by the
unregenerate, “through a process of reasoning and the accurate contemplation
of created things.”197 Moreover, the dogmaticians especially move beyond simply noting this fact and regularly provide examples of the kinds of evidence,
and rational inferences from it, that might be deemed sufficient to persuade
the open-minded skeptic of God’s existence.
196

Luther, Sermons on the Gospel of St. John, AE 22:149.

197
Quenstedt, Theologia Didactico-Polemica, quoted in Schmid, The Doctrinal Theology of the
Evangelical Lutheran Church, 107. The same is confessed, it is worth noting, also by the early
dogmaticians of the LCMS. So, e.g., Pieper, Christian Dogmatics, 1:310, affirms that “a natural,
rational observation of the creation reveals God as its Creator.” C.F.W. Walther similarly remarks that “a person, even without Holy Scripture, can be convinced that there is a God by
contemplating the world.” C.F.W. Walther, God Grant It: Daily Devotions from C.F.W. Walther,
trans. Gerhard P. Grabenhofer, ed. August Crull (St. Louis: Concordia, 2006), 876.

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This is evident, for example, already in the works of Luther’s contemporary and colleague Philip Melanchthon, who, in his commentary on the epistle
to the Romans will “briefly recite nine arguments from nature which testify
that God is the founder and preserver of things.”198 Commenting on “the order
of things in all nature,” for instance, he suggests that “we see how sure are
the laws that govern the movements of the heavenly bodies,” and asks: “Do
they not testify clearly that nature did not come into existence by chance, but
that they had their origin in some eternal mind?”199 Similarly, appealing to the
principle of causation, which “is treated at length in physics and is sufficiently
established,” Melanchthon can argue that “[c]auses are ordered in nature, so
that it is necessary to go back to one first cause which is not set in motion from
elsewhere, but moves the others. If it is the first, it is necessary that it have the
power to move itself.”200 This “prime mover” or “unmoved mover,” he recognizes, even the pagan philosophers had associated with God.

The significance of Gerhard’s reliance upon Aquinas is at least two-fold.
First, and positively, for the many differences between the theologies of
Lutheranism and medieval scholasticism, Gerhard rightly recognizes that
on matters of natural evidence rationally examined one certainly need not be
a Lutheran—or even a Christian206—to develop persuasive arguments and
to reach sound conclusions. Secondly, though, with less positive practical
implications, arguments first given coherent shape in the thirteenth century
will, in that shape, sometimes be much less persuasive when presented in the
aftermath of the “scientific revolution.”207 This is not to suggest that the laws
or theories of modern science actually disprove such arguments;208 it is only to
suggest that arguments of the sort developed by Aquinas and adopted by Gerhard will in some cases benefit from expansion, revision, or nuance, especially
when presented to a scientifically literate audience.

The Lutheran dogmatic tradition by no means universally followed
Melanchthon’s lead, it is true. Thus, the “second Martin,” Martin Chemnitz,
even while confessing that man is capable of acquiring a natural knowledge of
God’s existence, offers no arguments in his own dogmatics to demonstrate the
existence of God. But among those orthodox Lutherans theologians who do,201
the influential Johann Gerhard (1582–1637) offers the “most developed presentation of such apologetics to be found in Lutheran theology” at the time.202
Significantly, Gerhard’s “proofs” largely restate the “five ways” already developed by the medieval scholastic Thomas Aquinas.203 Thus, like Melanchthon,
Gerhard reiterates Aquinas’ argument for the logical necessity of a “prime
mover.” Similarly, because all effects result from a prior cause, all effects observable in nature must eventually trace back to a first cause, which, Gerhard
says, “we all call God.”204 Again echoing Aquinas, Gerhard also observes in
nature a teleology, or purposefulness, seen as evidence of nature’s “intelligent
design,” and therefore implying the existence of a supernatural designer.205
198

Melanchthon, Commentary on Romans, 77.

199

Melanchthon, Commentary on Romans, 78.

200

Melanchthon, Commentary on Romans, 79.

As previously noted, however, in light of the virtually unquestioned
authority attributed to science by many today, scientific data might be especially persuasive in attempts to establish a natural knowledge of God. Despite
frequently quoted assertions that “[o]ne of the great achievements of science
has been, if not to make it impossible for an intelligent person to be religious,
then at least to make it possible for them not to be religious,”209 or that certain
modern scientific theories make it “possible to be an intellectually fulfilled
atheist,”210 it is certainly not the case that any particular conclusions of scientific research rule out the possibility of God’s existence.211 [See Hardwired to
Believe? on the following page]

206
Many of Aquinas’ own arguments, for example, rest upon those of the pagan philosopher
Aristotle.

201
It is worth noting that these include even Johann Baier (1647–1695), whose Compendium
Theologiae Positivae (1685) was edited for republication in 1879 by LCMS father C.F.W. Walther.
202
Preus, The Theology of Post-Reformation Lutheranism, 2:37. Preus does note on the same page,
however, that Gerhard’s “approach is rather modest when compared with the elaborate arguments of the philosophers of the day.”
203

163

See Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Part 1, Question 2, Article 3.

204

Johann Gerhard, Loci Theologici, vol. 3 (Tübingen: J.G. Cotta, 1764), Locus 2, Chapter 4,
Section 61.
205
Gerhard also restates Aquinas’ argument from the “principle of sufficient reason” and the
distinction between contingent and necessary existence. Departing from Aquinas, though, and
reminiscent of Luther’s above noted comment on the mariners of Jonah, his fifth argument
appeals to what he views as man’s natural propensity to call upon divine aid when in danger.
Gerhard, Loci Theologici, vol. 3, Locus 2, Chapter 4, Section 61.

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207
To note only one example: the understanding of motion upon which Aquinas’ “first way” is
predicated differs radically from that set forth in, e.g., the laws of motion enumerated by Isaac
Newton (1642–1747).
208
Indeed, as will be noted below, some data and conclusions of modern science greatly
strengthen such arguments.
209

48.
210

Steven Weinberg, “A Designer Universe?” The New York Review of Books (21 October 1999),
Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker, 6.

211
This is candidly admitted by one scientific atheist, who writes that “[i]t is not that the methods and institutions of science somehow compel us to accept a material explanation of the phenomenal world”; instead, he explains, the denial of God as an explanation results “because we
have a prior commitment, a commitment to materialism.” Further, he goes on to state, “that
materialism is an absolute, for we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door.” Richard Lewontin,
“Billions and Billions of Demons,” The New York Review of Books (9 January 1997), 31.

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2016 Convention Workbook