LCMS Convention Workbook St. Louis, Missouri — 2016, Page 161

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IV. THEOLOGICAL DOCUMENTS­­—COMMISSION ON THEOLOGY AND CHURCH RELATIONS

the Lutheran Confessions themselves most frequently address the subject
of man’s natural knowledge of God and his law. The Formula of Concord
acknowledges, for example, that “[r]eason and the free will are capable of
‘living honorably to a certain extent externally.’”169 It can further assert that
those “works that belong to the maintenance of outward discipline are also
demanded of the unbelievers and unconverted and are performed by them,”
noting also that “such works are praiseworthy in the world’s sight and are
rewarded by God in this world with temporal benefits.”170 The Apology of the
Augsburg Confession not only speaks similarly with regard to natural reason’s
capability, “to a certain extent,” to discern and direct right human behavior,
but also with respect both to God’s requirement of this “righteousness of
reason” and his rewarding it with temporal benefits.171 Indeed, so insistent
are the confessors, when addressing the concerns of the left-hand realm, that
man’s natural reason is capable of and sufficient for discerning the law, they
can even rebuff as “insane” the suggestion that civil society be governed by
those laws specially revealed in Scripture.172 Instead, they can go so far as
to confess that “Aristotle wrote so eruditely about social ethics that nothing
further needs to be added.”173
Even outside of the confessional documents, the reformers consistently
speak in a similar fashion, occasionally doing so even more emphatically.
Speaking of the natural law, for example, Melanchthon can write of its
principles that “these constitute the ground rules for all human activity,”174
and that “[e]xternal life is to be regulated according to this natural light.”175
Likewise speaking of temporal matters, Luther can also write that here one
“needs no light but that of reason,” for this “natural light is sufficient.”176 With
reference to Moses, he can even be so bold as to assert that, “[w]here he gives
the commandments, we are not to follow him except so far as he agrees with
the natural law.”177
The apparent redundancy of the multiple quotations in the preceding two
paragraphs is intentional, and is meant to emphasize the consistent Lutheran
testimony on this point. Such emphasis is necessary because this point is
frequently misunderstood or even rejected by contemporary Christians. The
fear, among some, is that “promoting natural law to the role of rule and stan169

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dard in public life means relegating Scripture [to a secondary status] and so
potentially jeopardizing its sufficiency and sola Scriptura.”178 The language of
sola scriptura, as well as that of Scripture’s sufficiency, certainly resonates with
the heirs of the Lutheran reformation; and so Lutherans, too, may intuitively
share similar concerns regarding appeals to natural law rather than to the text
of Scripture. As the above quotations from the Confessions and their authors
reveal, however, such concerns need not be troubling where God’s left-hand
realm is in view. Scripture alone reveals the source of man’s salvation, and for
this revelation of salvation Scripture alone is sufficient. For the ordering of life
in the civil realm, however, appeals to Scripture, while not at all illegitimate,
are not, strictly speaking, necessary. Here, Luther can note, not only does one
need “no light but that of reason”; he can in the same context observe that in
some obvious respects even Scripture itself is not sufficient for guiding and
directing temporal affairs: “Hence God does not in the Scriptures teach us
how to build houses, to make clothing, to marry, to wage war, to sail the seas,
and so on.”179
In this light, then, the distinctive Lutheran teaching of God’s two realms
provides a theological justification for appeals to human reason and to the
natural law which it is capable of discerning. Further, though, as a merely
practical matter, such appeals not only hold out possibilities not afforded by
reference to special revelation; they might also avoid some potential pitfalls
attending the explicit use of Scripture in attempts to order public life in the
left-hand realm. Most fundamentally, social or political positions grounded
in reason, for example, proceed from a common ground shared by Christians
and non-Christians alike.180 Conversely, given the fact not only of contemporary religious pluralism, but also of increasing irreligion, appeals to Scripture
are easily ignored or dismissed by those not recognizing the authority of the
Bible or adhering to any specific doctrines derived from it. 181 [See Human
Beginnings: Faith or Science? on the following page]

178
Dan Strange, “Not Ashamed! The Sufficiency of Scripture for Public Theology,” Themelios
36 (August 2011), 251.
179
Luther, Epiphany Sermon, in Sermons of Martin Luther, 6:319. For this same reason one should
be wary of well-intended but often misguided attempts to establish “biblical principles” for all
manner of temporal concerns and endeavors, especially if such principles are assumed to be the
best or most useful simply because they are mentioned in Scripture.

FC SD 2.26.

170

FC SD 4.8.

171

Ap 4.22–24.

172

Ap 16.3.

173

Ap 4.14.

174

Melanchthon, Loci Communes (1521), in Melanchthon and Bucer, 50.

180
Thus, e.g., atheist libertarian Nat Hentoff can describe himself as adamantly opposed to
abortion “not for religious reasons, but because I’m an atheist who can read biology.” Nat Hentoff, “Election Day,” Jewish World Review (3 November 2012), available online at http://www.
jewishworldreview.com/cols/hentoff100312.php3.

175

Philip Melanchthon, Loci Communes (1555), in Melanchthon on Christian Doctrine, ed. Clyde
L. Manschreck (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), 128.
176

Martin Luther, Epiphany Sermon (1522), in Sermons of Martin Luther, 6:319.

177

Luther, How Christians Should Regard Moses, AE 35:173.

181
Thus, for example, certain positions on the contentious questions of abortion or marriage
are sometimes characterized and then dismissed as exclusively “religious” positions. Summarizing the conclusions of the Pew Research Center’s 2012 study, “Nones” On the Rise, one
commentator notes that this is made especially easy because, increasingly, those unaffiliated with any religion “have an antagonistic attitude toward religious institutions. They tend
to think that churches are too focused on rules…. They also think that the churches are too
involved in politics…. They would like to see religion (for all practical purposes, this means

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Human Beginnings: Faith or Science?
Immediately upon seating herself at the cafe table,
across from new friend and fellow medical student
Sally, an obviously agitated Jane blurted out, “Why
do you Christians insist upon imposing your religious values on the rest of us?”
Caught off guard, Sally could only respond, “I have
no idea what you’re talking about.”
Jane explained that, while driving across town
for their weekly coffee and study session, she had
passed a women’s medical clinic, outside of which
were gathered a number of individuals. Some knelt
in what was obviously prayer, while others stood
with placards reading, God is Pro-Life, Thou Shalt
Not Kill, and, more cryptically, Psalm 139:19. “Whatever you, personally, feel about it,” she continued,
“abortion is perfectly legal in this country, the
Supreme Court has upheld this—and, I might add,
the separation of church and state—on numerous
occasions, and so I simply don’t understand why
you Christians keep insisting that it’s wrong and
should be prohibited just because you think your
Bible says so.”
“Ah,” replied Sally, “I see. Well, then, let me try to
explain, and perhaps clarify. First, you made reference to the separation of church and state. You of
course realize, though, that this idea, or something
like it, appears in the same constitutional amendment that protects the free exercise of religion. So,
just as you believe women have a ‘right to choose,’
those individuals you saw believe—correctly—that
they have a right to express their religious views.”
“Yes, of course they do,” Jane acknowledged; “but
they don’t have a right to impose them on people
who don’t share those views.”
“No, you’re right,” Sally granted; “though I don’t
think that simply praying, or holding a sign, imposes anything at all. Nor, actually, do I think that
the views held by those people—or myself—are
necessarily or exclusively religious views.”
“Of course they are! Why else would they be quoting the Bible?”
“Well,” said Sally, “I will grant you that I myself don’t
think quoting the Bible is the best approach to this
debate. But certainly you can see that at least one
of those signs you mentioned, Thou Shalt Not Kill,
expresses a belief that’s not unique to Christians, or
to the religious more generally. I mean, the courts
have also pretty consistently upheld that murder is
wrong, and so prohibited.”

“Okay, sure; but abortion simply isn’t murder, and
the only reason you Christians think it is has to do
with your pre-scientific Bible saying that life begins
at conception.”
“Well, yes, perhaps some Christians do base their
views of life on what the Bible says. But, again,
the view that life begins at conception certainly
isn’t a uniquely Christian or even religious view.
In fact, you’ll cover this in some detail next year
in embryology.” As Sally said this she was already
retrieving from her bag the weighty eighth edition
of the textbook assigned by her own instructor,
The Developing Human: Clinically Oriented Embryology. “Here,” she said, flipping through the first few
pages, “on page fifteen, Moore and Persaud write,
‘human development begins at fertilization,’ and
that this ‘marked the beginning of each of us as a
unique individual.’ That’s not a religious view, but a
scientific one—and a nearly unanimous scientific
one. In fact, the very title of another textbook I
was reading, Harrison’s, Golbus’s, and Filly’s The
Unborn Patient: Prenatal Diagnosis and Treatment,
just about says it all. And the authors open their
first chapter in the same vein, when they write that
‘the fetus is a patient, an individual.’ Because this
actually is the medical consensus, even someone
like Princeton’s Peter Singer, who openly advocates
for abortion, admits in his own textbook on Practical Ethics that ‘there is no doubt that from the first
moments of its existence an embryo conceived
from human sperm and egg is a human being.’”
Jane was quiet for a moment, before asking simply,
“Really? Why have I never heard this before? Why
do I get the impression from both pro-lifers and
pro-choicers that abortion is a religious issue?”
“It’s not my place to comment on either side’s
motives,” replied Sally. “But really, behind all the
rhetoric from both camps, the issue is quite simple.
Whatever religious agreements or disagreements
people might have, the issue of abortion comes
down to premises that aren’t explicitly religious
at all, and that all reasonable and informed individuals should be able to agree on: the unjustified
taking of human life is wrong, and that which
comes into being with human conception is a
human life.”
To which Jane, before placing her coffee order,
merely replied, “Hmmm…”

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However lamentable this may be for those who do recognize that Scripture is authoritative, the logic which prompts such dismissals is readily
understandable. It is the very same logic by which Christians dismiss Islamic
prohibitions on the eating of pork, for instance, or the prohibition on blood
transfusions among Jehovah’s Witnesses.182 As one author has concisely summarized the state of affairs outlined above:
if the principles of the Law of Nature are accessible to our unbelieving fellow citizens because they are written on those citizens’
hearts, then we have a basis for talking with them about the
moral concerns relevant to the creation of [civil and criminal]
law. Without this basis, we are left with the prospect of pummeling these unbelievers with biblical texts whose authority
they do not accept—a strategy of communication with little
prospect of success and, more importantly, little correspondence
with New Testament examples of how the apostles communicated with Gentile unbelievers.183
The “prospect of pummeling these unbelievers with biblical texts” is not,
however, the only alternative to dialogue and debate proceeding from the
natural law discernible by all rational human beings. To the extent that these
biblical appeals are judged ineffective, the Christian might simply be tempted
to retreat into “quietism” and to withdraw altogether from the public square.
This, though, is hardly a more desirable alternative. Insofar as “Christian witness” might be understood not only as witness that is Christian (that is, biblical
and evangelical), but also as witness by Christians (even without reference to
Scripture or gospel), it would be a tragedy simply to surrender discussions
of the common good and a well ordered public life to the unregenerate. The
reason for this is to be found even in the very context of Scripture’s confession
that the unregenerate are not without a natural knowledge of the law. Just as
St. Paul declares that all men possess a natural knowledge of God, and yet
suppress this knowledge, so too does he write the same regarding the natural knowledge of the law: “Though they know God’s decree that those who
practice such things deserve to die, they not only do them but give approval
to those who practice them” (Rom. 1:32). Similarly, in the very same context
in which Luther can rather shockingly claim that Moses is not to be followed
“except so far as he agrees with the natural law,” he also insists that “Moses
agrees exactly with nature,”184 and, elsewhere, that “the natural laws were
Christianity) exercise less influence over society.” R.R. Reno, “The New Secular Majority,” First
Things (December 2012), 4.
182
As each of these teachings is ostensibly supported with reference even to the Old Testament
writings accepted by Christians, such examples also highlight the fact that quoting Scripture to
establish moral norms is not entirely unproblematic even with respect to those who fully accept
the authority of Scripture. That is to say, the matter is not only one of biblical authority, but also
of interpretation and application.
183

Timothy L. Hall, “A Law for All Seasons,” Touchstone (June 2009), 29.

184

Luther, How Christians Should Regard Moses, AE 35:168.

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2016 Convention Workbook