LCMS Convention Workbook St. Louis, Missouri — 2007, Page 391

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THEOLOGICAL DOCUMENTS—COMMISSION ON THEOLOGY AND CHURCH RELATIONS 391

We are aware that one of the most common reasons given to sup-
port destroying embryos for stem cell research focuses on the
promise of therapies that could provide significant help to people
who are seriously ill or handicapped. Don’t these neighbors, whom
some would also designate “the least of these,” deserve our loving
aid and protection? Are they not also our neighbors in need? As we
noted above, people who reason this way are implicitly claiming
that the burden of proof lies on those of us who oppose embryonic
stem cell research and would deny potentially life saving therapies
to people in need. They say that unless we can provide convincing
arguments in support of protecting pre-implantation embryos, then
we have not met the burden of proof and the harvesting of stem cells
from embryos should be permitted.

While we grant the moral urgency of caring for people in need, we
cannot, in the absence of convincing arguments, grant the removing
of protections from pre-implantation lives whose moral status is so
closely connected with the moral status of al] humans. Furthermore,
we are by no means at a point in contemporary research at which use
of embryonic stem cells is the last and best hope for ameliorating the
suffering of these people. Indeed, scientists are currently exploring
whether the use of adult stem cells, obtained in ways that cause no
moral uncertainty, might not provide a more promising and effective
line of research than use of embryonic stem cells.

Research and scientific debate concerning the relative merits of
using adult stem cells rather than embryonic stem cells is constantly
changing as new results and information are published. An Internet
search on “adult stem cells” and on “alternatives to embryonic stem
cells” will produce a long list of articles and websites reporting re-
sults and/or contributing to the debate. In the midst of changing in-
formation one point stands out: use of embryonic stem cells is not
the only promising line of current research. This point prompts us
to question why, in the absence of clear and convincing arguments
that show destruction of embryos to be a moral practice, so much
scientific and political pressure has been generated to rush forward
with embryonic stem cell research when other promising work
could first be pursued.

We have seen evidence of several factors creating the pressure.
These include human scientific curiosity: people have a strong desire
to unlock the secrets of the embryo whether or rot the research is
promising practically or controversial ethically. Another factor is an
understandable desire not to leave any stone unturned in the search for
cures for people suffering disease and disability. Yet another factor is
the promise of economic gain. In this last case the argument seems to
be that somewhere in the world the research will be done, and the re-
search may yield unimaginable economic gain. Why should I, or my
university, or my state forego the possibility of these riches simply be-
cause the moral status of the embryo is uncertain? Roe v. Wade is
thought to leave people free to choose life or death for nascent life on
the basis of the desires and needs of adult humans. Many now are pre-
pared to choose death for embryos in order to serve the curiosity, de-
sires and needs of adult humans.

We also noted that some have claimed that the moral/spiritual sta-
tus of pre-implantation human life is mysteriously ambiguous. Such
claims point to our lack of certainty concerning the significance of hu-
man beginnings. These claims cannot be used as arguments to lift the
burden of proof for those who would remove protections.

The more challenging approaches uncovered in part two are
those that develop lines of reasoning meant to demonstrate the sig-
nificant difference morally and spiritually between pre-implanta-
tion life and human life in the womb and in the world. These lines
of reasoning require careful examination.

Inherent Indicators in Scientific and Philosophical Perspectives

Some maintain that pre-implantation human life differs from im-
planted human life because none of the cells in the newly fertilized
egg has yet specialized for differentiated tasks. They point out that

one cannot distinguish between the cells that will become placenta
and those that will become the individual. They note that for the
same reason the individuality of the fertilized egg is somewhat am-
biguous, because natural or artificial division of the cells into two
parts can produce two distinct individuals who share a common
DNA inheritance. They contend, therefore, that the moral status of
pre-implantation human life differs from that of an embryo that has
differentiated cells and has achieved implantation in the womb. In
part two we provided an extended example of this line of thought
from Roman Catholic ethicist Thomas Shannon.

Shannon’s argument is biologically informed and sophisticated,
but the evidence is not as straightforward as he makes it out to be.
For example, Princeton’s Robert George points out that these un-
differentiated cells in the embryo are nonetheless “‘a unitary, self-
integrating, actively developing human organism.” The fact of
undifferentiation and monozygotic twinning in the early embryo,
he points out, “certainly does not show that the embryo is a mere
‘clump of cells.’”*' He explains how the embryo, already at the two-
cell stage, is synthesizing a glycoprotein that is instrumental “in the
compaction process at the eight-cell stage.”®? In his view this and
other evidence makes the point “that from the zygote stage forward,
the embryo is not only maintaining homeostasis, but is internally
integrating various processes to direct them in an overall growth
pattern toward maturity.”®

Our point is that the scientific facts concerning the earliest stages
of pre-implantation human life do not obviously support removing
protection from such life. Indeed, the impressive unitary and for-
ward-looking development of the embryo actually supports a pos-
ture of respect and support toward all embryonic human life. In our
survey we noted that Michael Panicola, in a way similar to our ap-
proach, sympathizes with arguments like those offered by Thomas
Shannon, but concludes that these considerations do not “suffi-
ciently” work to overcome the burden of proof required to depart
from “previously held views of the value of human life in its earli-
est beginnings.”

Some who advocate removing protection from pre-implantation
human life focus on matters concerning the physical, mental, and
emotional capacities of living humans as opposed to pre-implanta-
tion human life. This line of reasoning rejects the suggestion that
the potential to develop such capacities makes pre-implantation
human life morally identical to living humans. The difference in ac-
tual capacities is said to make a significant difference in moral/
spiritual status.

We need not pause long over this old argument. Human life is
characterized by many physical, mental, and emotional capacities
in various stages of realization. Well known hazards attend any
framework for ethical decision-making that would deprive a human
being protection for his or her life simply on the grounds that she
or he has failed to realize one or another capacity. .

Relational/Historical Indicators in Scientific and Philosophical
Perspectives

In our survey in part two and in our constructive discussion of
biblically informed approaches here in part three we gave special
attention to lines of reasoning that approach our questions from a
standpoint of relational/historical indicators. We must now criti-
cally examine lines of reasoning in this approach that seek to show
why protection can be denied to pre-implantation human life.

The opposing side contends that in the light of our actual rela-
tional practices, the moral/spiritual status of pre-implantation hu-
man life can be seen to be significantly different from that of living
humans in the womb and in the world. This line of argument stresses
the very different way in which parents and the rest of society do
typically relate to pre-implantation human life. Moral/spiritual sta-
tus is assessed in the light of how we typically relate. Actual prac-
tice is taken to be illustrative of the underlying moral significance.

2007 Convention Workbook