LCMS Convention Workbook St. Louis, Missouri — 2007, Page 386

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386 THEOLOGICAL DOCUMENTS—COMMISSION ON THEOLOGY AND CHURCH RELATIONS

sonhood to the embryo and those who deprive the embryo of all dig-
nity. University of Paris legal philosopher Bernard Mathieu takes a
position opposite to Sandel: he argues that there is no third posi-
tion. University of Bristol ethicist Alastair Campbell argues that
however difficult the third position may be, scientific progress is
forcing us to refine our moral categories to get beyond the either/or,
all-or-nothing presumptions so often found in these debates.*°

Still others argue, on what they take to be scientific/philosoph-
ical grounds, that the moral/spiritual status of pre-implantation hu-
man life can be seen to be not simply ambiguous but in fact
significantly different from that of living humans in the womb and
in the world. Some focus on what they take to be decisive differ-
ences between pre-implantation human life and live-born humans.
Here are some of the arguments for this position.

Pre-implantation human life differs from implanted human life
in several important respects. Because none of the cells in the newly
fertilized egg has yet specialized for differentiated tasks, one can-
not distinguish between the cells that will become placenta and
those that will become the individual. For the same reason, the in-
dividuality of the fertilized egg is somewhat ambiguous because
natural or artificial division of the cells into two parts can produce
two distinct individuals who share a common DNA inheritance.
Some argue that these facts about newly fertilized eggs make their
moral status different from that of an embryo having differentiated
cells and having achieved implantation in the womb. Roman
Catholic ethicist Thomas Shannon writes in Commonweal:

We can think of the preimplantation embryo as our common human na-

ture for two reasons. First, even though this entity is genetically distinct

from its parents and even genetically unique, it is not yet individualized.

Individualization does not occur until after the process of restriction is

completed, some two weeks after the process of fertilization. To my

mind, this process is a biological analogy to Scotus’s concept of the prin-
ciple of individuation, the constricting of the common nature into an in-
dividual. After the process is completed (normally after two weeks), the
cells are committed to being specific cells in specific body parts. This

is the biological beginning of true (though not full) individuality and, I

would argue, marks a critical ethical line.

However, prior to that time, these human cells are indifferent to be-

coming specific cells in this particular body. They are not, I would ar-

gue, morally privileged by virtue of individuality or, a fortiori, by
personhood. True, they are morally privileged by being human cells,
cells that manifest the human genome, and as such are an entity that rep-
resents the essence of human nature. This is the second reason why the
preimplantation embryo can be understood in terms of Scotus’s “‘com-
mon nature.” Essentially such research would be utilizing cells that in
fact represent what is common to humans in the most basic sense; our
common human nature in the blastomere is preindividual and preper-
sonal. And because these cells are our common human nature and not

individualized human nature (the minimal definition of personhood), I

argue that cells from this entity may be used in research to obtain and

develop stem cells for use in transplantation or to develop specific hu-
man tissue or perhaps even organs.

Clearly those from whom such entities come must consent to this re-

search, and the blastomeres must be handled with respect. But ulti-

mately, such research is not research on a human person. It is research
on our common human nature, and as such is morally justifiable.*”

Michael Panicola summarizes a related line of thought this way:
it is claimed that “the preimplantation embryo is in a pre-personal
stage of development at least until it attains a certain level of bio-
logical stability, which coincides with the formation of the primi-
tive streak, and as such is only entitled to limited respect and
protection.” He goes on to argue, however, that these considerations
do not “sufficiently” work to overcome the burden of proof required
to depart from “previously held views of the value of human life in
its earliest beginnings.”

A related consideration of differences typically focuses on mat-
ters concerning the physical, mental, and emotional capacities of
living humans as opposed to those of pre-implantation human life.

2007 Convention Workbook

This line of reasoning rejects the suggestion that potential to de-
velop such capacities makes pre-implantation human life morally
identical to living humans. The difference in actual capacities is said
to make a significant difference in moral/spiritual status.

Relational/Historical Approaches

Those who approach the main question from a standpoint of re-
lational/historical indicators also often begin from the agreement
that we are asking questions about pre-implantation human life and
that we typically accord full moral/spiritual status to living humans.
Those who seek relational/historical indicators argue more or less
along the following lines.

Some argue that full moral/spiritual status is shown by the very
words “human life.” No morally relevant distinction can or should
be made concerning how we relate to fertilized eggs and how we
relate to living humans. Pre-implantation human life differs in no
morally relevant way from human life in live-born humans. Con-
sequently, the protective, caring relationships owed to live-born hu-
mans are owed also to pre-implantation human life. Oliver
O'Donovan offers a detailed and carefully nuanced theological ver-
sion of this approach in chapter four of his book Begotten or Made?
(“And Who is a Person?”). His arguments are examined below in
connection with our discussion of “Biblically Informed Theologi-
cal Perspectives” because O’ Donovan situates these arguments in
a theological as well as scientific/philosophical context.

The opposing side argues that, in the light of our actual relational
practices, the moral/spiritual status of pre-implantation human life
can be seen to be significantly different from that of living humans
in the womb and in the world. This line of argument stresses the
very different way in which parents and the rest of society do typ-
ically relate to pre-implantation human life. Moral/spiritual status
is assessed in the light of how we typically relate. Actual practice
is taken to be illustrative of the underlying moral significance.

An illustrative thought experiment was proposed by Boston Uni-
versity law professor George Annas. Steve Stice, a stem cell re-
searcher at University of Georgia, reports how Annas’s thought
experiment has influenced his thinking. Annas “asked a group of
scientists to imagine a tank of frozen embryos in one corner of a
room and a five-year-old child in the other corner. When a fire
breaks out, who or what do you save first? The answer is obvious—
we don’t view embryos in the same light as a five-year-old child.”
Writing in the Lancet, Riccardo Baschetti suggests that “what dif-
ferentiates a pile of bricks from a house is the human investment,
in the form of labour, sweat, and care. Likewise, what differentiates
a human embryo from a human being is the parental investment.”
“By contrast,” he maintains, “in the case of an embryo, in stages at
which its existence is generally unnoticed, the parental investment
is nought.”*°

People also point to differences in naming and other relational
activities, including Baptism and funeral/memorial practices. The
conclusion is that we (rightly) respect pre-implantation human life
while not according to such life the moral/spiritual status ascribed
to living humans.

In part one we noted that in the best of circumstances the prac-
tice of in vitro fertilization only about one third of embryos trans-
ferred to the woman’s reproductive system lead to a successful
beginning of a pregnancy, let alone to a live birth. We further noted
that this loss of embryos in IVF mimics results in natural concep-
tion. Physician Carolyn B. Coulam reports that “the magnitude of
[naturally occurring] fetal wastage in humans is considerable, ap-
proaching a loss of up to three quarters of fertilized ova.”*! In light
of this fact of nature some argue that nature itself seems to relate to
pre-implantation human life differently than to implanted life.

In summary, we have examined two different approaches within
scientific and philosophical lines of reasoning. One approach looks
for inherent indicators of moral/spiritual significance, and the other