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LCMS Convention Workbook St. Louis, Missouri — 2019, Page 187

Scan: The Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod

Transcription machine transcription, uncorrected

I. OPINIONS OF COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS
As the italicized portion clearly indicates, the provision
adopted does not apply only to the case of a district president
“charged with any action that would disqualify him from office” but also (indeed, with the apparent intention to apply
primarily) to the cases of pastors, professors, or teachers, in
which the “district officers,” inclusive of the district president,
“fail to act.” Subsequent developments of this bylaw provision
in 1971, 1983, 1986, etc., as already noted in the footnotes to
CCM Op. 16-2791, consistently bear out this understanding.5
The commission’s reading of 1956 Res. 6-11 and Bylaw 5.23 in
CCM Op. 16-2791 is, thus, the correct reading: the President
of the Synod, if the district officers failed to act, by virtue of
the power given him in Const. Art. XI B 1–3, was empowered
to institute proceedings against members (pastors, professors,
teachers, district presidents, etc.), take administrative action
(that is, in terms of present procedure, suspend such members)
and, if necessary, present charges to the District Board of Appeals. The President of the Synod had this authority explicitly
from 1956–1989, when it was unconstitutionally transferred to
the Praesidium (1989–2004) and then, in 2004, to referral panels (2004–2016). Prior to 1956, by virtue of the fact that Bylaw
5.23 was adopted as a clarification and not as a grant of new,
extra-constitutional power, the President of the Synod had this
authority constitutionally, though it was not elaborated in the
bylaws of the Synod.
It bears repeated note, as Op. 16-2791 already pointed
out, that only since 1965 has Const. Art. XIII 2 read, “Expulsion shall be executed only after following such procedure as
shall be set forth in the Bylaws of the Synod.” This replaced
the 1924–1965 provision of Const. Art. XIII 2, “Such expulsion is executed as a rule by the Districts of the Synod [meaning the district conventions]; yet those so expelled have the right
of appeal to the Synod [meaning the Synod convention].”6 In
the post-1965 “modern” era of the expulsion processes of the
Synod, the convention has been free to set forth in the Synod
Bylaws procedures for expulsion that are not ultimately carried
out by the district and Synod conventions; at the same time,
that procedure has been required to be fully specified in the Bylaws (present Const. Art. XIII 2). Through that entire period
there has been some bylaw mechanism for an accuser to appeal
beyond the inaction of a district president on an accusation
laid, though the designated recipient of that appeal has varied.
Through the entire period, that mechanism has initiated the
same due process bylaw procedure that would have been initiated by a district president.
The conclusion is that the conventions have not desired the
inaction of a single district officer (who is not elected by the
whole Synod) to frustrate in his district—at least until the next
Synod convention—the ultimate exercise of ecclesiastical supervision, thereby depriving the congregations and workers of his
district of the application of Synod’s one standard for doctrine
and practice (Const. Art. II, Bylaw section 1.6) and denying to
them the furtherance of Synod’s objectives (Const. Art. III 1,
8, and 9). The Synod, after all, “is not merely an advisory body
in relation to a district, but establishes districts in order more
effectively to achieve its objectives and carry on its activities.
A district is the Synod itself performing the functions of the
Synod. Resolutions of the Synod are binding upon the districts”
(Bylaws 4.1.1–4.1.1.1).

187

Op. 16-2791 calls for nothing new in calling for bylaws that
allow an appeal for action beyond a district president’s inaction on charges laid. Instead, Op. 16-2791, Res. 12-14, and the
bylaws proposed thereunder simply direct that appeal for action
to the one constitutionally authorized to act on it—on behalf of
the whole Synod—as so clearly stated by the 1956 convention of
the Synod: namely, the President of the Synod.

2. Scope of the Power of the President of the
Synod under Op. 16-2791, Res. 12-14, and Bylaws
Proposed
The request for reconsideration is posed as if Op. 16-2791
and the bylaws proposed to satisfy 2016 Res. 12-14 grant a blanket authority for the President of the Synod to exercise fully and
immediately, himself, that supervision assigned to district presidents in Const. Art. XII 7–8. Whether the President of the Synod could be granted that identical authority under hypothetical
bylaws is not presently the issue. Neither Op. 16-2791 nor the
bylaws drafted, under 2016 Res. 12-14, to satisfy the constitutional requirements posed by Op. 16-2791, give the President of
the Synod that immediate and identical authority. What must
be dealt with is the actual case, in which the authority of the
President of the Synod to take administrative action in the case
of a member under district supervision is being dealt with only
under two important qualifiers:
••

Of present interest is the ability of the President of
the Synod to initiate formal proceedings only in a
matter involving doctrine or practice. Const. Art. XI
B 1–3 grants the President of the Synod supervision
over “doctrine [Lehre]7 and administration [of office,
Amtsverwaltung].” It does not deal explicitly with
life [Leben], which is mentioned along with doctrine
[Lehre] and administration of office [Amtsführung] as
the “especial” charge of district presidents. Clearly,
the standing interpretation is that the President of the
Synod has the authority to supervise the life, as well,
of those Synod officers and district presidents subject
to his direct supervision [cf. Bylaw Sections 2.15 and
2.17], and the commission sees no warrant to challenge this standing interpretation, as “[a]ll officers of
the districts have the same rights and duties as those
outlined in this Constitution for the officers of Synod
but only insofar as these apply to the district and only
within the boundaries of their districts” (Const. Art.
XII 6). Thus, if a district president supervises the life
of an individual member under his supervision, the
Synod president, who has the same office, but with
respect to the Synod and not a particular district, has
the self-same supervision over those individuals he
directly supervises. These are surely to be subject to
the same standard of expulsion (Const. Art. XIII and
VI) as other members of the Synod, which includes
offensive conduct and blamelessness of life.

Nonetheless, neither Op. 16-2791 nor the bylaws proposed
under Res. 12-14 (reviewed in Op. 17-2828) propose extending a
backup supervision of the life of individual members under district supervision to the President of the Synod—only a backup
supervision of those matters explicitly treated under Const. Art.
XI B 1–3, namely, doctrine and administration of office (a.k.a.
2019 Convention Workbook