LCMS Commission on Constitutional Matters — Minutes St. Louis, Missouri — February 6–7, 2026, Page 11

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First: That a presidential concurrence once clearly given in response to a clear request under Bylaw 2.14.4.2
cannot be voided, so as to restore the possibility of appeal for action. The Bylaws provide no specific
mechanism for an appeal for action to be revived following a presidential concurrence under Bylaw
2.14.4.2. “Expulsion shall be executed only after following such procedure as shall be set forth in the
Bylaws of the Synod” (Const. Art. XIII 2). Where the bylaws and attendant SOPM do not themselves
provide means of procedural correction, the ability to correct procedural errors is severely curtailed. Where
a concurrence is requested, the onus is on the Synod President to ensure that any doubt about sufficiency
of the material before him is resolved before he grants any such concurrence. Once he has concurred, a
subsequent discovery of the incompleteness of the prerequisite material does not give him the right to
withdraw or void his concurrence and proceed to take up the now-precluded appeal for action.
Second: That, the concurrence feature of Bylaw 2.14.4.2 having been added as “a mechanism to help district
and Synod presidents to speak ‘with one voice’ in potentially contested declinations to suspend” (Secretary
Memo), its purpose would be frustrated if such concurrence, once granted, did not terminate the matter at
hand. The concurrence mechanism brings a matter, so far as it extends, before the ultimate sitting authority
responsible for the doctrinal and practical unity of the Synod, namely the President, and gives him a stated
window in which to act (or not) upon such facts as are presented to him. This preserves the right of the
accused to timely process, while allowing the President either to “speak with one voice” together with a
district president in dismissing a matter or—should he have any doubts about concurring—the right at the
time to preserve the ability of an accuser to appeal for action.
Third: That the onus of “the supervision regarding the doctrine and administration” and the responsibilities
to “conscientiously use all the means at [the President’s] command to promote and maintain unity of
doctrine and practice in all the districts of the Synod” (Const. Art. XI B 1–3) rests here, as elsewhere, on
the President. These are duties he is expected to perform in good faith, upon which good faith the Synod
ultimately relies. His concurrence concludes with finality the process initiated by the formal written
accusation presented to him. The President is the ultimate determiner of whether the requirements of Bylaw
2.14.4.2, upon which his concurrence is contingent, have been carried out, and the time for him to make
that determination—as regards the process for potential expulsion of the accused—is before he would grant
concurrence in the disposition of that process. There is no mechanism provided in the Bylaws for
independent or latter-day review of the sufficiency of materials provided to the President under Bylaw
2.14.4.2, much less, of the extent or quality of his review of those materials. The district president and
President must be accountable for the conduct of their offices, but that is a matter outside the particular
Bylaw section 2.14 process and with no impact on it.
Question 2:

Does the complainant have the right to request and receive confirmation or evidence that
the President of the Synod received and reviewed the full written charges and the record of
the district president’s investigation, as required by Bylaw 2.14.4.2, prior to concurring
under Bylaw 2.14.4.2 (a)?

Opinion:
See above as to “and reviewed.” There is no standard or finder of fact for latter-day review
of this aspect. As to “received,” neither the Bylaws of the Synod nor the relevant SOPM establish such a
right. The concurrence of the President of the Synod under Bylaw 2.14.4.2 necessarily includes the implicit
certification that, in the determination of the Synod’s ultimate ecclesiastical supervisory officer, the
procedure stated has been followed in good faith, including the provision of all required materials. The
President could explore doubts in this regard as part of his ecclesiastical supervision of the district
presidents, but the complainant has no such independent right.
The Bylaws do not preclude an accuser from inquiring of the accused’s district president whether the entire
formal written statement of the matter was conveyed to the President, or of the President, whether such was
received or how it was reviewed. At the same time, the Bylaws do not establish a right to a response.

CCM Minutes – February 6–7, 2026 – Page 145