# Synodical Conference Convention Proceedings_St. Louis Missouri_1878_S34
# AI translation — CHI Digital Archive (demonstration)

— 34 —

given understanding is not possible. One agrees in the understanding of the expression "flesh of flesh" not only with the more recent lexicographers and exegetes, for example Gesenius, Fürst, Keil, but also with the great majority of the old Lutheran exegetes and dogmaticians, for example Chemnitz, Gerhard, Mentzer, the Weimar Bible, who hold שְׁאֵר בְּשָׂרוֹ, flesh of flesh, to be only a fuller manner of expression for the simple שְׁאֵר, flesh. And that they do so rightly is shown clearly by comparing the passages Lev. 20:19, where the sister of my father or of my mother is called my flesh, and not my flesh's flesh, although the second degree is in question here; further Numbers 27:8 ff., where שְׁאֵר, flesh, after the naming of related persons in the first and second degrees, is used for the designation of blood kinship in general, just as in Leviticus 25:49 שְׁאֵר בְּשָׂרוֹ after relatives in the first, second and third degree. Luther too stands on the side of this understanding, since in the only two passages where שְׁאֵר בְּשָׂרוֹ, flesh of flesh, occurs (Leviticus 18:6 and chap. 25:49) he renders it by "nearest blood relation," where "nearest" would be quite unsuitable if it were meant to designate relatives in the second degree. Gerhard expresses himself most clearly (ed. Preuss, p. 258), saying: 'One may not approach to שְׁאֵר בְּשָׂרוֹ, to the flesh of his flesh, that is, to her who stands nearest to my flesh (quae proxime carnem meam attingit); and so that no one may suppose that the prohibition is to be extended to infinity, certain definite degrees are also listed which explain by way of examples (qui exempli loco declarant) which persons and which degrees are to be understood under the name of relatives of the flesh. It is not forbidden a person, says Radulphus, to approach any relative whatever, but only to approach those whom what follows will define exactly.' Gerhard obviously does not hold, then, that Leviticus 18:6 alone by itself, even without the following examples, indicates quite sufficiently which persons and degrees are forbidden."

To this it must be replied:

Either Leviticus 18:6 contains a rule, or it contains no rule. If the former is the case, and on this all are agreed, then it must have a purpose; and this purpose can only be that by it the boundary is drawn for the permitted degrees of marriage. But a boundary would not be given here if שְׁאֵר בְּשָׂרוֹ designated every kinship whatever; for all human beings, white, black, and red, as descended from one blood, are related to me, and I should therefore not be able to marry at all. No, the words שְׁאֵר בְּשָׂרוֹ must in this passage, where they are to fix a boundary, and indeed so important a boundary, have a quite definite, not an elastic sense. And this sense must, as in a sedes doctrinae [seat of doctrine], be the proper original one, from which only one circumstance could move us to depart, namely this, that a clear