# Synodical Conference Convention Proceedings_St. Louis Missouri_1878_S18
# AI translation — CHI Digital Archive (demonstration)

— 18 —

if he has no daughter, you shall give it to his brothers; if he has no brothers, you shall give it to his uncles (לַאֲחֵי אָבִיו = the brothers of his father); if he has no uncles, you shall give it לִשְׁאֵרוֹ [to his kin], to his flesh, to him who is the nearest to him of his family (הַקָּרֹב אֵלָיו מִמִּשְׁפַּחְתּוֹ).' This agrees entirely with that sentence in Lev. 18 and can serve to show what God wants understood by the nearest of His flesh, namely all who have sprung nearest with me from the same flesh. The Septuagint have translated it οἰκεῖον [of the household, kindred] of his flesh; but this word has a wider meaning, and can be taken of relatives and relatives by marriage, as those who are in one and the same house or from one and the same house. Therefore it must be limited by the word 'of the flesh.' From this the judgment concerning affinity is also to be taken, insofar as marriages are also forbidden in this. Man and wife are one flesh. Both therefore have שְׁאֵר, that is, they have remnants of their flesh in the relatives of the spouse. From this foundation and from the remaining description in Leviticus 18, definite rules are established, that and how from the naming of the persons in Leviticus 18 certain degrees can be inferred." (Loci theol. P. III. fol. 207.)

Quite similar to these prohibitions of marriage is the case of the tenth commandment; only there the general rule stands, conversely, at the end, while the individual cases cited are put first. Now it would be very foolish if someone were to say: "My neighbor's plow and coat I may covet, for these objects are not named," while they are nevertheless covered by the general rule.

Now there stands, to be sure, among the series of cases enumerated in Leviticus 18 one, namely marriage with the uncle's wife, v. 14, for which no ground is given that reaches back to the general rule, as is the case with the remaining cases, but a different one, "for she is thine aunt," that is, a person of respect. This is well worth noting. It would indeed be most foolish to conclude, from the circumstance that a different ground is given here, that this prohibition is therefore not binding; just as foolish as if someone wanted to conclude: Because stealing is not forbidden in the sixth commandment, I may steal. But the degree of kinship present in this case also differs from the degrees of the remaining cases; and since the ground added in this case takes account not of the degree but of a relation of respect, the prohibition in this case is likewise not to be extended to all persons who stand in the same degree of kinship, but perhaps to all who stand in the same relation of respect, thus for example to the uncle by marriage and his niece. For that reason the case named in Lev. 18:14 is also designated in the thesis as an exceptional case.

A testimony for what is said in our thesis from the Christian Church of the first centuries is cited by Chemnitz; he writes: "A