# Lehre und Wehre_St. Louis Missouri_Februar 1858_S50 # AI translation — CHI Digital Archive (demonstration) 50 Menius and Flacius in Their Dispute over Ministry and Priesthood. ...aptly designates it; he demands full authority and commission for the exercise of the office of testimony. But the chief question, the one that actually matters and which Menius answers in his own fashion, remains entirely unresolved in the passages of Luther that Menius cites — namely: are the functions of the universal priesthood essentially different from those of the preaching office, does the former really consist only in this, that it must offer the spiritual sacrifices of prayer, of thanksgiving, of good works, as Menius maintains; or does the holder of the preaching office, in his office, perform only the functions of his own universal Christian priesthood? Upon the answer to this question always depends the standing of the individual member of the congregation vis-à-vis the office, and, incidentally, also the right of Flacius with regard to his public appearance. If one wishes to obtain Luther's answer on this matter, one finds oneself directed away from these passages to a countless multitude of others among Luther's remaining writings. We must first see how Flacius understands the relationship of the universal priesthood to the office, and Luther's statements on the matter. First of all, it is evident from his response*) that he is by no means a despiser of church order, but rather recognizes in it God's own order and command. He justifies any occasional appearance of those not called only in the case of urgent necessity. "But as concerns the calling, one must know, first, that although the regularly appointed persons must, by God's command, preside over those to whom they are appointed, and no one else should meddle in their office but should obey and follow them, this is nevertheless not to be understood as applying to a case of utmost necessity. For necessity, as they say, breaks iron. Necessity breaks the law also; and as the jurists say, necessitas non habet legem." "As, for example, if someone is about to strike another dead, or likewise if a fire suddenly breaks out, and the regular authority is either not present, or otherwise unwilling or unable to prevent it, then everyone there is duty-bound to run up and to prevent it, be he the highest or even the lowest of persons." "I ask: since Peter at Antioch thus limped [in his conduct] and by his example brought true religion into danger, whether even the lowliest Christian — even if he had been a purchased, bond-servant slave — would have had the power and calling to rebuke Peter publicly, especially if Paul and other eminent teachers had not done so? Indeed, he would not only have had the power, but would have been obliged to do so. As to whether such a bond-servant would thereby have exalted himself above Peter and caused disorder or a riotous faction — that I do not hold." *) Apologia, Bog. C, Bl. 2 ff.