# LCMS Commission on Constitutional Matters Minutes_St. Louis Missouri_December 2 2025_S4
# Machine transcription, uncorrected — CHI Digital Archive (demonstration)

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Section 7.3: The commission notes, with regard to “contract rights,” that the default position on
employment by an agency of the Synod, unless otherwise specified by the respective board, is that
“all employees shall serve at the pleasure of the appointing authorities” (Bylaw 3.11.1).
The provision provided deals only with those officers appointed by the president and not with those
appointed by the board, such as the Secretary.

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Section 7.5*: The words “the CUS” should be removed. The president is not responsible to the
board for governance of the university, but for “supervision, direction, and administration of
affairs” (Bylaw 3.10.6.7 [b]); governance is the board’s exclusive domain.
The commission newly observes that the grant of authority to the president seems extremely broad
and may lead to confusion about where the authorization of the board or even of the Board of
Directors of the Synod is required, for example, in certain actions involving real property. It is
misleading to grant such broad and apparently unilateral power to the president when such
requirements apply to many of the actions described, practically, as sovereign.
The designation of the president as the interpreter of the policies, not only of the Board, but of the
Synod, is surely not correct. The president’s interpretation of Synod regulations is not authoritative,
and the board bears responsibility under Bylaw 3.10.6.1 (passim) for ensuring the university is
governed relative to these requirements.

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Section 7.7: It is unusual for the president and not the board to determine who will be treasurer of
the corporation. Under (c), the reference to the “delegations” of Section 2.3 (g) is unclear in context.
Is the university’s foundation serving as a depository for the university? The commission notes that
the potential authority granted to the treasurer under (b), and potentially further delegated by the
treasurer to others under (d), may require careful and ongoing regulation by the board.

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Sections 7.8–10*: It would be more appropriate, avoiding confusion of governance and the
executive, for the board to authorize an assistant secretary to handle some or all of these duties,
rather than allowing the president to designate an individual other than the board’s elected secretary
to serve as secretary of the institution. Section 7.9 is omitted. The commission reiterates, with
regard to the extremely broad delegation here, its comments on Section 7.5.

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Section 8.1*: The university is not required to consider a “graduate assistant” to be part of the
faculty.

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Section 8.2*: The Bylaws of the Synod do not assign “governance authority,” as regards the
university, to the faculty. This is the exclusive province of the governing board of the university,
the board of regents. The first sentence also presents a general interpretive challenge and must be
revised. The commission newly notes that policies of CUS should also be removed from the last
sentence.

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Section 10.1: The advance approval of the commission, which is the requirement, should be more
apparent here (Synod Bylaw 3.9.2.2.3 [a]).

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Section 11.1: This provision is not complete without a statement along the lines of Synod Bylaw
1.2.1 (f)(2), that the university would (like corporate Synod) “intend to retain all authority and
autonomy allowed [an educational institution of a church body] under the laws and Constitution of
the United States and the State of [Wisconsin].” The university has an obligation—as incumbent
upon regents in Synod Bylaw 3.10.6.1 (l)—to assert the First Amendment in common with the
Synod in defense of free exercise.

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Section 11.5: The university’s obligation to offer these for examination (Bylaws 1.5.3.5, 1.5.4)
should be stated.

CCM Minutes – December 2, 2025 – Page 130