# Lehre und Wehre_St. Louis Missouri_Dezember 1856_S367
# AI translation — CHI Digital Archive (demonstration)

The Distinction of Estates in the Church. 367

belonged to the Roman bishops was suspended by these provisions, and
consequently, by jure superioritatis [by right of superiority],
devolved upon the evangelical princes and estates of the empire (jus
devolutionis [the right of devolution]). In order to save the
presupposition of the system against the Augsburg Confession, the next
characteristic assumption was that the prince represents a double
person, being simultaneously the holder of civil and ecclesiastical
power, yet with the restriction that one must distinguish between
potestas ecclesiastica externa et interna [external and internal
ecclesiastical power], and that the princes and bishops are extra
ecclesiam [outside the church]. The sum total of the rights in
ecclesiastical matters which had devolved upon the princes, or which
still remained with the Church, was called, borrowing the canonical
term, jus episcopale [episcopal right], and this was in turn divided
according to the four divisions established in canon law: jura ordinis
[rights of order], lex diœcesana [diocesan law], jurisdictio
ecclesiastica [ecclesiastical jurisdiction], jura dignitatis
episcopalis [rights of episcopal dignity]. To round off and at the
same time to support the whole system, the doctrine of the three
hierarchical estates, taken over from elsewhere, was meant to serve,
as the estates out of which, according to this conception, the Church
was composed. All abuse of the principles thus set up was thought to
be guarded against by the further assertion that the civil magistracy
might claim no power over consciences — a power which does not even
belong to the ecclesiastical authority — for which reason it should
also be regarded as an encroachment if, at synods, princes or
magistrates wished to abolish or alter ecclesiastical ceremonies
without consulting the teachers of the divine Word or the
ecclesiastical estates generally; it being understood, however, that,
so that everything might proceed in an orderly manner, the people
should be represented by the magistracy on such occasions. As
accessory — though not without deeply affecting the roots of the
episcopal system — are to be reckoned, on the one hand, certain
lemmata, and on the other, the application of certain scriptural
passages, chiefly from the Old Testament. Among these belong
particularly Isa. 49:23, Ps. 2:12, 24:7, Deut. 17:18-19 (together with
the parallel and illustrative Josh. 1:7, 2 Kings 11:12, 2 Chron.
23:11), 1 Tim. 2:2, from which, singly and taken together, one wished
to deduce the Cura principum [the princes' care] in church matters
according to this notion. Into the circle of those doctrines was
received, alongside the old maxim: "Magistratus custos utriusque
tabulæ est" [the magistrate is the guardian of both tables (of the
Law)]" — (soon Melanchthon's limitation of the same, "quoad externam
disciplinam" [as regards external discipline], was pushed entirely
into the background) — a good deal that has an almost baroque
appearance, e.g., that the emperors were formerly also called
Pontifices, for which reason it was thought all the less objectionable
to regard the evangelical princes as bishops; that otherwise they
would have far lesser prerogatives than the Roman prelates; and
finally, that even the Augsburg Confession does not begrudge the pope
political power. All these grounds are actually found in the jurist
Carpzov, the greatest representative of this system. — If we now wish
to examine this system, first of all, in its basic outlines, then