# LCMS Convention Workbook_St. Louis Missouri_2013_S395
# Machine transcription, uncorrected — CHI Digital Archive (demonstration)

THEOLOGICAL DOCUMENTS­­—COMMISSION ON THEOLOGY AND CHURCH RELATIONS
 Belief that the Scriptures do not address same-gender relationships as they are known in
the contemporary world. The community is best served when these relationships are held
to high standards of public accountability but these relationships are not equated with
marriage. They should receive the support of the community and may be blessed with
prayer.
 Belief that the Scriptures do not speak to sexual orientation and committed relationships
as they are experienced today. These relationships should be held to the same standards
as heterosexual marriage and receive the same benefits of such marriages (HSGT, 20-21).
After outlining these positions currently present in the ELCA, the document repeats its plea that
a lack of consensus ought to make space for the bound conscience:
Although at this time this church lacks consensus on this matter, it encourages all people
to live out their faith in the local and global community with profound respect for the
conscience-bound belief of the neighbor. The church calls for mutual respect in
relationships and for guidance that seeks the good of each individual and of the
community. Regarding our life together as we live with disagreement, the people in this
church will continue to accompany one another in study, prayer, discernment, pastoral
care, and mutual respect. (HSGT, 21.)
An explanation for the conceptuality of the bound conscience is supplied in note 26 of HSGT
(see Excursus, below, for a further discussion of bound conscience as the concept is used in
HSGT). This footnote is instructive as it sheds light on the way the terminology of “conscience”
is used in the document in at least three ways. First, the conscience is identified in connection
with moral responsibility as expressed in the first chapters of Romans: “The Apostle Paul
testifies to conscience as the unconditional moral responsibility of the individual before God
(Romans 2:15-16). In the face of different conclusions about what constitutes responsible
actions, the concept of ‘the conscience’ becomes pivotal” (HSGT, 41). Second, both Paul in
Galatians and Luther at Worms are said to have taken a stand on the basis of conscience for the
sake of the Gospel. Third, when salvation is not at stake, Christians are free to give priority to the
well being of the neighbor and so protect the neighbor’s conscience as matters of diet or ritual
observance of holy days. Thus the footnote concludes: “This social statement draws upon this
rich understanding of the role of conscience and calls upon this church, when in disagreement
concerning matters around which salvation is not at stake, including human sexuality, to bear one
another’s burdens (Galatians 6:2), honor conscience, and seek the wellbeing of the neighbor”
(HSGT, 41).
While HSGT connects conscience with moral responsibility, it fails to attend to how the
conscience functions “as the self’s internal court of judgment”48 to use the words of Uwe
Schnelle. The conscience lacks an autonomous capacity to moral responsibility. “For Paul,
conscience does not itself contain the basic knowledge of good and evil but rather a coknowledge, a knowledge-with, of norms that serve as the basis for making judgments that can be
either positive or negative.”49
48

Uwe Schnelle, Theology of the New Testament, translated by M. Eugene Boring (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic,
2009), 313.
Uwe Schnelle, 314.

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relies on the Word of God.”55 Michael Baylor describes this regency of Scripture over
conscience in Luther’s thinking:
Repeatedly at Worms Luther asserted that his conscience was captive to the Word of
God. But he did not say, and should not be interpreted as having intended to say, that
Scripture was captive to his conscience. In that Luther’s defiance at the Diet of Worms
was based upon both evident reason and especially, the literal sense of Scripture as the
two objective and legitimate authorities with the power to bind and instruct his
conscience, he was not a subjectivist in religion. The subjective sense of certainty with
which he held his theological convictions did not function, either materially or formally,
as a criterion for the truth of these convictions. It acted rather, as the basis from which he
resisted the claims of what he refused to accept as a legitimate authority—any human
authority, especially popes and councils. Luther did not raise the conscience itself to the
status of such an authority, parallel to that of reason or Scripture, with its own power
even to share in or partly determine the content of faith.56
HSGT, however, gives wide berth to the function of conscience, neglecting its limitations and
unreliability.57 For Luther conscience is not bound to itself. Bound to itself, the conscience will
either be captivated by the terror of the law’s accusations or driven by impulses toward selfjustification. The conscience is alternately accusing or excusing (see Romans 2:15-16).58 This
aspect of conscience is ignored in HSGT. HSGT seems to use interchangeably “the bound
conscience” and “conscience-bound belief.” In truth, only the conscience bound to the consoling
word of the Gospel is given certainty and peace in the forgiveness of sins. “Conscience-bound
beliefs,” on the other hand, bind us to our own opinions. No matter how deeply treasured these
convictions are, they provide no certainty. In elevating “conscience-bound beliefs,” HSGT
reveals a stridently anthropocentric position that is detrimental both for ethics and pastoral care.
Conscience-bound beliefs can be wrong, since the conscience is untrustworthy.59 It is, in the
words of Gerhard Forde, “insatiable, fickle, and arbitrary. It does not represent God’s presence
within us, it represents his absence, that we are left to ourselves. Conscience can unpredictably
55

AE 9:123.
Michael G. Baylor, Action and Person: Conscience in Late Scholasticism and the Young Luther (Leiden: E.J.
Brill, 1977), 267-268.
57
Here also note the extensive discussion of conscience by Helmut Thielicke, Theological Ethics, Volume I:
Foundations, edited by William Lazareth (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966), 298-358. In his discussion of the
“autonomous conscience,” Thielicke observes that conscience cannot be synthesized with God’s revelation (332);
Also see Mary Jane Haemig: “The conscience is not ‘sacred’ and thus exempt from sin: it is part of the created
world and thus as subject to sin as any other part of the world. The view that the conscience is ‘sacred’ can lead to
the elevation of human conscience above the law and thus to an antinomianism inimical to the Lutheran
Confessions.” See “Lutheran Thinking on Church-State Issues” in Church & State: Lutheran Perspectives, edited by
John R. Stumme and Robert W. Tuttle (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003), 15. HSGT errs precisely in this way as it
elevates the conscience over God’s Word.
58
Also note Werner Elert: “Conscience must be held to be the same as the ‘conflicting thoughts which accuse and
excuse each’….The conscience is no information center to furnish ready answers to the question, ‘What must I do?’
Conscience is no specific quality but a continuous process, the process of conflicting thoughts which accuse and
excuse each other.”See The Christian Ethos, trans. Carl J. Schindler (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1957), 33
59
The Bible is replete with warnings about unwarranted trust in conscience alone: e.g., Num. 15:39; Judg. 17:6;
21:25; Ps 31:1-2; Prov 3:7; 12:15; 14:12; 16:2; 16:25; 21:2; 30:12; Is. 5:20-21; Jer. 13:10; 17:5-9. The NT generally
uses the term “conscience” (sunei,dhsij) with the understanding that it has been shaped by the Word of God (e.g.,
because Paul refuses to tamper with God’s Word and speaks it openly, he commends such conduct to the conscience
of the Corinthians, 2 Cor. 4:2).

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It appears that the HSGT’s appeal to “conscience” is at least in part anchored in a history of
interpretation that goes back to the claim of Karl Holl (1866-1926), a professor at the University
of Berlin and leader in the “Luther Renaissance.”50 Holl wrote, “Luther’s religion is a ‘religion
of conscience’ in the most pronounced sense of the word, with all the urgency and personal
character belonging to it.”51 This religion of the conscience was seen by Holl as evidence that
Luther was not a medieval but a modern man and therefore relevant to the world of the twentieth
century.
The application of “bound conscience” to the issue of homosexuality is deeply problematic from
a confessional Lutheran perspective. Classical Lutheran theology makes a distinction between
adiaphora, mandata, and damnabilia.52 Matters of adiaphora are not binding on conscience, but
Christian conscience is bound to keep what God has commanded and avoid what he prohibits.
HSGT quotes Luther’s speech at Worms: “Unless I am persuaded by the testimony of Scripture
and by clear reason….I am conquered by the Scripture passages I have adduced and my
conscience is captive to the words of God. I neither can nor desire to recant anything, when to do
so against conscience would be neither safe nor wholesome” (HSGT, 41; see AE 32:112).
However, the document incorrectly attributes to Luther an understanding of conscience that is
autonomous and capable of functioning reliably apart from God’s Word. Randall Zachmann
rightly observes “The conscience does not have the ability to judge the truth or falsehood of the
positions themselves; otherwise Luther’s appeal at Worms to be further instructed would be
meaningless.”53 He then concludes “The conscience is a capacity for judging good and evil but
it is not in itself an infallible source for knowing what is good and what is evil. One can have a
true conscience only if one follows true teaching, not if one follows the feeling of the
conscience.”54
HSGT assigns to the conscience an autonomy that it does not have in Luther. Conscience is
given a mastery over the Word of God. In this scenario amply illustrated by HSGT, individual
consciences are then bound by their own interpretations of the Holy Scriptures, so we are left
with a variety of options for moral action but no certainty. In contrast, Luther, in his 1525
lectures on Deuteronomy, asserts that “God wants our conscience to be certain and sure that it is
pleasing to Him. This cannot be done if the conscience is led by its own feelings, but only if it

50

The Luther Renaissance is the title usually given to the reawakening of scholarly interest in Luther and his work
which took place in the period between the two wars in Germany. It is associated especially with Karl Holl. For a
helpful overview, see Thomas Brady, Jr. “Luther Renaissance” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Reformation,
Volume 2 (Dord-Manu), edited by Hans J. Hillerbrand (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1996),
473-476.
51
Karl Holl, What Did Luther Understand by Religion? Edited by James Luther Adams and Walter F. Bense,
translated by Fred W. Meuser and Walter R. Wietzke (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977), 48. For a critique of Holl
and a further exploration of Luther’s understanding of conscience see George Forell, “Luther and Conscience” in
Martin Luther: Theologian of the Church: Collected Essays edited by William R. Russell (Saint Paul: Luther
Seminary 1994), 57-65.
52
Oliver K. Olson, “Adiaphora, Mandata, Damnabilia” Lutheran Forum (Spring 2010): 22-25. Adiaphora are things
neither commanded nor forbidden by God’s Word. Mandata are things God commands. Damnabilia are things God
forbids and condemns.
53
Randall C. Zachman, The Assurance of Faith: Conscience in the Theology of Martin Luther (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1993), 23.
54
Zachmann, The Assurance of Faith, 28.

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make mockery of presumed freedom and emancipation.”60 Given the unpredictability of the
conscience as it is driven to excuse and accuse, it is hardly a trustworthy anchor for belief or
action. One’s conscience-bound beliefs may include an array of opinions and activities from theft
to racism, from bestiality to child sacrifice. The subjectivity of conscience is indeed a slender
thread to hold a responsible morality in place.
Where conscience-bound beliefs govern rather than the Word of God, we are led to what Luther
sees as an identifying mark of the theologian of glory. Such a theologian, Luther asserts, “calls
evil good and good evil. A theology of the cross calls the thing what it actually is.”61
Theologians of glory, as Forde explains, “think one can see through the created world and the
acts of God to the invisible realm of glory beyond it.”62 The argument advanced for the bound
conscience, unfortunately, is such an attempt to “see through the created world,” the bodies God
has created, and the revelation of God in Christ. In its attempt to accommodate diverse teachings
on homosexuality, HSGT also accommodates a false optimism about the human condition
instead of the call of the Cross to death and resurrection with Christ.
Over and against HSGT, confessional Lutheranism bears witness to the truth of the Holy
Scriptures’ teaching on God’s creation of humanity, namely, as male and female designed by
Him to live within the fidelity of the one flesh union He has established in marriage—a union,
that His creative Word makes life giving. The Christian church has no authority to bless what
God condemns. Brevard Childs writes:
The recent attempt of some theologians to find a biblical opening, if not warrant, for the
practice of homosexuality stands in striking disharmony with the Old Testament’s
understanding of the relation of male and female. The theological issue goes far beyond
the citing of occasional texts which condemn the practice (Lev.20:13). Nor is the heart of
the issue touched by the historicist’s claim that Israel was obsessed with the propagation
of children to assure the nation’s survival. Rather, it turns on the divine structuring of
human life in the form of male and female with the potential of greatest joy or deepest
grief. The Old Testament continually witnesses to the distortion of God’s intention for
humanity in heterosexual aberrations (Judg. 20; 2 Samuel 13). Similarly the Old

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60
Gerhard Forde, “Eleventh Locus: The Christian Life” in Christian Dogmatics, Volume 2, edited by Carl Braaten
and Robert Jenson (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984), 417. Also see Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Dietrich Bonhoeffer
Works, Volume 6: Ethics, edited by Clifford Green, translated by Reinhard Krauss et al (Minneapolis: Fortress
Press, 2005). Bonhoeffer writes “Men of conscience fend off all alone the superior power of predicaments that
demand decision. But the dimensions of the conflicts in which they have to choose, counseled by and supported by
nothing but their own conscience, tear them to pieces. The countless respectable and seductive disguises and masks
in which evil approaches them make their conscience anxious and unsure until they finally content themselves with
an assuaged conscience instead of a good conscience, that is, until they deceive their own consciences in order not to
despair. Those whose sole support is their conscience can never grasp that a bad conscience can be stronger and
healthier than one that is deceived” (79).
61
Martin Luther, “Heidelberg Theses” in AE 31:53.
62
On Being a Theologian of the Cross: Reflections on Luther’s Heidelberg Disputation, 1518 (Grand Rapids: Wm.
B. Eerdmans Publishing Co, 1997), 12. Robert Kolb and Charles Arand remind us that only Christ’s cross “enables
his people to confront and describe themselves and the world around them honestly and forthrightly. The theology
of the cross liberates God’s children from having to construct falsehoods in order for life to make sense.” See The
Genius of Luther’s Theology: A Wittenberg Way of Thinking for the Contemporary Church (St. Louis: Concordia
Publishing House, 2007), 147. Gene Edward Vieth has a basic discussion of the theology of the cross in The
Spirituality of the Cross (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1999), 57—60.

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2013 Convention Workbook