# Lehre und Wehre_St. Louis Missouri_April 1856_S126 # AI translation — CHI Digital Archive (demonstration) 126 Excerpts as Contributions to Pastoral Casuistry. person who is one flesh with a person with whom he who wishes to marry that person is likewise already one flesh. But parents and children are called one flesh, further, spouses, and finally siblings. Because near kinship or affinity is thereby taken into consideration, this rule already implicitly contains within it the prohibition of the still nearer blood relation. For example: if a man may not marry his daughter-in-law, still less may he marry his own daughter; or if he may not marry his mother's sister, still less may he marry his mother. The narration of the cases does indeed illustrate the rule; but in the mouth of the lawgiver the narrated cases are more than illustration — they are authentic interpretation. Hence one may, in certain cases, go beyond the rule, or, in certain cases, authentically restrict what the rule would otherwise imply; and this is indeed found to be so. Since nothing can be presumed to have been set down idly and in vain, close attention must be paid to every word of the lawgiver, whether they constitute an extension or a restriction, or whether they constitute an explanation of the point to which God wished attention to be given, or whether they state a reason for the prohibition, or consist in the emphatic intimation that God simply willed it to be so — which latter is contained in the words: For I am the LORD. In order that one may also apply this to equivalent cases of such laws where additions are attached, and to which accordingly regard must likewise be had — all of them, without exception, true duties. Hence one may indeed with certainty take as something conflicting with the divine order or with the present condition of the human race whatever is expressly or tacitly represented in Scripture as being of that kind — that is, as contrary to natural right or natural law. These two expressions, moreover, carry the same meaning among people who are not led, by any deliberate seeking of excuses to justify harmful errors and to mutilate the doctrine of natural virtue. I say, whatever is stated in Scripture as being contrary to the natural moral law may certainly be assumed to be of that character, even when one is not yet able to explain the ground of it in nature. For perhaps that ground is only difficult to perceive, or is liable to easy misinterpretation among unfair and untrained minds, so that the decisive judgment of it may not even be left to the discretion of such people — I mean, it is not open to them to acknowledge and follow the duty only in proportion to the reasons which they themselves can grasp. The Israelites, for this reason, were held merely to the divine will: I am the LORD, or to the divine pronouncement: it is an abomination, an infamy, and the like. But it does not yet follow from this that a thing must belong to the absolutely necessary and unchangeable laws of nature, or that it has, in all the circumstances in which peoples or individual persons may find themselves, one and the same kind and degree of obligation. For example: marriage between father and daughter, and between brother and sister, are both contrary to natural law, yet with a difference. Because love of one's fellow man is certainly a natural duty, it obliges every individual to the observance of what the common welfare and security require. And as soon as nations and organized states are established, the rulers are bound, in particular, to see to this and to make provision for it. In this way natural laws are once again derived from what the common welfare of mankind requires, so far as the ground extends by which they are to be held to be such."