# LCMS Convention Proceedings_St. Louis Missouri_1981_S123
# Machine transcription, uncorrected — CHI Digital Archive (demonstration)

124 SPECIAL PRESENTATION OF TASK FORCE II

similar freedom in deciding who shall cast its second
vote, not restricting the choice to lay people but
permitting the congregation, if it so desires, to choose
instead of a lay person either a parochial school teacher
or a clergy member of the congregation. We are also
proposing that in the case of a pastoral vacancy the
congregation should not be deprived of one-half of its
vote but should be permitted to continue to have its two
votes in whichever way these may be designated by the
congregation. Werecommend that congregations which
are served by lay ministers should also have the right of
two votes and that a more liberal approach be introduced
for dual and multiple parishes, in which congregations
have often felt disfranchised.

Please note carefully that the decision in each
instance lies almost exclusively in the hands of the lay
people. We are not in favor of creating a house of bishops
on the one hand and a house of the laity on the other
hand or to pit one against the other. We have had too
much of that. The Synod is essentially a group of
congregations (consisting of lay persons, clergymen,
and teachers) who have joined hands to walk together,
incidentally to walk together as partners and not to
walk in lockstep at the command of a top sergeant, an
important point to remember in discussing the basic
philosophy of our synodical organization.

Centralization

That leads us to the second directive of the Anaheim
convention, which was to avoid centralization of power
within the synodical structure itself. This presented a
real challenge for Task Force II.

Responsibility and Accountability

On the one hand it should be freely acknowledged
that even though we are in a walking-together relation-
ship, nevertheless, in any organization there must be
clear designations of responsibility and clearly estab-
lished lines of accountability. It is a mistake, however,
to assume that this will necessarily lead to unwanted
centralization. '

During the 16 years that I have served on the Board
of Directors I have heard repeatedly, especially in the
last 5 or 6 years, the complaint even within the board-
room itself that the Board of Directors does not have
sufficient authority. That complaint is based at least in
part on fact. In part it is based on a misunderstanding of
the historical role of the Board of Directors in the life of
the Synod. Many of our people are inclined to equate the
Board of Directors of the Synod with the Board of
Directors of General Motors or some other profit-making
corporation. They regard it as the governing body of the
Synod. This is not true. The Board of Directors of the
Synod was never intended to be that and is not intended
to be that under the proposals of Task Force II. If a
comparison must be made to American corporate life,
then it would be more correct to say that the share-
holders of the Synod are the congregations, all of the
good people out there comprising the congregations, and
they in turn elect representatives to the governing body,

namely, the conventions. The conventions are the
governing bodies of the Synod and of its Districts. Th
convention in turn elects various boards. One of them:
called the Board of Directors, a name which many of ug
regard as an unfortunate misnomer. It is a board which
is directly concerned with business affairs, with:
property administration, and with the legal respons
bilities of the Synod. “Board of Trustees” or “Board of
Finance” might more adequately describe the functions.
of that board.

Nevertheless, it is obvious that between conventiong:
it is advisable that one group be charged with certai
overall responsibilities, especially in terms of coordin
tion. We are therefore proposing that the Bylaw
governing the Board of Directors be amended to giveth
board responsibilities in seeing to it, together with th
President, who has the primary constitutional respon
sibility, that the resolutions of the Synod are impl
mented, and furthermore, that these resolutions ar :
properly prioritized on the basis of the funds that a
available for the work, and that they are properl
coordinated to avoid duplication or oversight.

Checks and Balances

You will notice that this three-fold responsibilit
extends to the resolutions of the convention. It is not th
intent that the Board of Directors should arbitraril
direct and govern the various program boards, suppo
services boards, and commissions of the Synod, there
making them non-entities. In areas assigned to other
groups the Board of Directors may indeed recommen
but may not require. However, the Board is of course
be given certain authority in emergency situations as
required under corporate law.

If one wishes to avoid centralization of power within
a body like the Board of Directors or any other board o:
office, then it is advisable to spell out precisely what
responsibilities are. Where there are no clear directives
a vacuum exists, and this is where very often th
vacuum is filled in an unwanted way by those who are
aggressive. Therefore, we have tried painstakingly to
pin-point responsibility and to set forth very clearly the
lines of accountability.

Furthermore, Task Force II recommends that thé
Minutes of the Board of Directors be made available
any member of the Synod upon request. And, perha}
above all, Task Force II proposes that the Board 6
Directors be made more representative through t.
election of a greater number of persons to that Boar

In addition, it is being proposed that the chairman
the three program boards be members of the Board
Directors, present at all meetings for full and fr
discussion.

Greater Involvement in the Nominating Proce

What else have we done to carry out the Anahet
directive to avoid centralization of power? Well, we
proposing that every District elect a representative 0
the nominating committee of the Synod. In this way
hope to identify a much larger number of qualified mé