# LCMS Convention Workbook_St. Louis Missouri_2016_S159
# Machine transcription, uncorrected — CHI Digital Archive (demonstration)

IV. THEOLOGICAL DOCUMENTS­­—COMMISSION ON THEOLOGY AND CHURCH RELATIONS

IV. Natural Knowledge and Christian Witness
Even those who deny that God is, still they are not ignorant that God
is. ~ Johannes Quenstedt144
The reasons why God imparted the external knowledge of Himself to
the minds of all men are: (1) For the sake of external discipline, which
God wished to be exercised by all men, even the unregenerate; (2) that
God might be sought after (Acts 17:27–30); [. . . and . . .] (3) that He
might render men inexcusable (Rom. 1:20). ~ Martin Chemnitz145

A. Common Ground and Christian Witness
Thus far the examination of the biblical, confessional, and dogmatic
treatment of the natural knowledge of God—as well as various historical and
contemporary rejections of it—has proceeded by treating the subject largely
in, of, and by itself. Consequently, the impression might be given that such
an investigation’s primary concern is the question of what the non-Christian
might come to know of God in, of, and by himself. The questions and concerns
which gave rise to this study, though, were not prompted by a merely academic curiosity. They were prompted, instead, by the conviction that such a
study might have practical “implications for our public witness,” and, more
specifically, that it might “assist the members of the congregations of the
LCMS in their witness.”146
Before proceeding to a discussion of such practical implications and
potential assistance, however, it is worth pausing briefly to suggest that these
emphases on natural knowledge in the specific context of Christian witness
perhaps shed further light on some of the confusions and contentions noted
in previous sections. Insofar as the focus remains on the abstract question of
what knowledge might be naturally attainable by a hypothetical unbeliever
entirely ignorant of God’s special revelation in Scripture, answers may well
vary; but they will remain “academic” and “impractical.” That is, the orthodox
Christian will conclude that whatever knowledge is naturally attainable by
the solitary unbeliever is impractical, indeed useless, for acquiring salvation.
As the concerns prompting this study make plain, however, and as most
treatments of natural theology regularly reveal, attention is not primarily
focused on the solitary unbeliever in, of, and by himself. It is instead focused
especially on those unbelievers with whom Christians are in dialogue and to
whom Christians witness. In this context, it might be said that some awareness
144
Quenstedt, Theologia Didactico-Polemica, Part 1, chapter 6, section 2, question 1 (Leipzig,
1715), 373–74.
145

Martin Chemnitz, Loci Theologici (1591), quoted in Schmid, The Doctrinal Theology of the
Evangelical Lutheran Church, 110.
146

Resolution 3-04A, 2007 Convention Proceedings, 121.

of God’s natural revelation, some understanding of the natural knowledge of
God and his law, and some facility with natural theology are indeed potentially useful—not in the first instance for the unbeliever, but for the Christian
engaged in witnessing to him or her. Each might, in such a view, be seen in
some respects as “tools” in the hands of the Christian evangelist. The utility of
any tool, however, presupposes its proper use. To press the analogy further,
the right use of any tool further presumes an awareness of its intended purpose, its inherent capacities, and its inevitable limitations.
As the above pages have consistently highlighted that the most significant limitation of natural theology is that a natural knowledge of God does
not, and cannot, extend to a knowledge of the gospel, it will thus be clear that
gospel proclamation per se is not the immediately intended purpose of natural
theology. Instead, in the context of Christian witness, the purpose of appeals
to natural revelation, natural law, and natural theology have traditionally been
understood as preliminary or preparatory to the proclamation and elucidation
of the gospel.147 Often, for example, this preparatory task is described in terms
of an attempt to establish “common ground” or a “point of contact” between
the Christian and non-Christian.
Though the apostles, and Christ himself, are never described in the pages
of the New Testament as engaging in evangelistic witness to those who might
be recognized as atheists or even agnostics in modern terms, it remains clear
that their witness to non-Christians regularly proceeds from some assumed
or established common ground. Apostolic testimony in the Hebraic milieu,
for instance, frequently began by meeting the Jews “where they were”—quite
literally in those cases of proclamation within Mediterranean synagogues, but
also more generally in appeals to the shared authority of the Hebrew scriptures and the shared belief in a promised Messiah.148 Though the analogue with
natural theology here is obviously inexact—the Old Testament being specially,
rather than naturally, revealed, and the expectation of a Messiah being predicated on this special revelation—it is nonetheless noteworthy that the apostles
regularly proceed from those authorities and beliefs acknowledged by their
audiences, and which they often hold in common with their audiences. Further, this common ground often allows the apostolic proclamation to progress
logically and rhetorically from that which a given audience does know to that
which it therefore should know.149
147
E.g., in a letter explaining the intent of the BBC radio broadcasts which would eventually
become, in published form, the early chapters of Mere Christianity, C.S. Lewis described his argument for and from a natural knowledge of the law as “praeparatio evangelica rather than evangelium.” C.S. Lewis, The Collected Letters of C.S. Lewis, ed. Walter Hooper, 3 vols (San Francisco:
HarperSanFrancisco, 2004), 2:484. As will be noted below, however, to speak of “preparation”
need not imply a necessary chronological priority.
148
See, for example, Peter’s proclamation at Pentecost (Acts 2:14–36), Philip’s encounter with
the Ethiopian eunuch (Acts 8:26–35), and Paul’s testimony in the synagogue at Pisidian Antioch
(Acts 13:13–43).
149
The sermons of Peter in Jerusalem and Paul in Pisidian Antioch are again illustrative. Each
refers, for example, to King David’s confession that “you will not abandon my soul to Sheol, or

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Especially illustrative and so often cited in this regard is the apostle Paul’s
Areopagus proclamation (Acts 17:22–31), which, addressed to those who did
not recognize the authority of God’s special revelation, is also a closer analogue to much modern Christian evangelism. Before further examination of this
proclamation itself, however, two preliminary considerations deserve recognition. The first is simply that, while the Areopagus speech itself begins “where
the Athenians are” (namely, with reference to their own gods), this is not the
point at which Paul’s preaching in Athens more broadly begins. Rather, it had
begun with Paul’s proclamation, in the synagogue and in the marketplace,
of Christ and his bodily resurrection from death—a point on which he and
his more philosophically inclined hearers decidedly did not share common
ground (cf. Acts 17:18 and 17:32). It is the very peculiarity of this preaching
which prompts some among Paul’s audience to request that he speak to them
further, prompting his later Areopagus address. This order of events is significant in that it makes plain that appeals to the non-Christian’s own beliefs,
assumptions, or authorities, while potentially helpful, need not be given any
chronological priority in Christian witness. As Paul himself does in Athens,
one might—and perhaps even should—begin with the proclamation of the
gospel itself, strange as it may sound to one’s hearers. As curiosity is piqued,
or as objections arise, a shift to some recognized point of contact might then be
deemed appropriate.

proclaims, “we ought not to think that the divine being is like gold or silver or
stone, an image formed by the art and imagination of man” (v. 29). Revealing
their logically untenable conceptions of the divine, Paul can then call their
“knowledge” what it in fact is: “ignorance” (v. 30). He can thus call upon them
to repent of their false worship, and can finally draw their attention once again
to the “man whom [God] has appointed,” and through whom “he has given
assurance to all by raising him from the dead” (v. 31).

A further preliminary point deserving recognition is that, even in Paul’s
own establishment of a point of contact with his audience, there is no indication that all of the Athenian beliefs to which he initially appeals are deemed
by the apostle to be either true or good. Quite the contrary; Luke specifically
records that, upon observing the many idols of Athens, Paul was “provoked”
(Acts 17:16). And yet it is also noteworthy that, in addressing his idolatrous
audience, he does not immediately, or at all, appeal to biblical prohibitions
against graven images (e.g., Ex. 20:4) or to the biblical confession that God
is one (e.g., Deut. 6:4). Rather than quoting that special revelation which
his audience neither possesses nor recognizes as authoritative, Paul instead
highlights that which his hearers already do know and accept.
With regard to the content of Paul’s address itself, that which he emphasizes as already known and understood by his hearers is readily apparent. They
accept, for instance, the fundamental importance of religion in general (v. 22).
They understand that they nevertheless lack some knowledge of the divine,
as evidenced by their altar “To the unknown god” (v. 23). They understand
that there exists a deity in whom “we live and move and have our being,”
and that “we are indeed his offspring” (v. 28). Thus quoting their own authors
to them, Paul effectively transitions from what his non-Christian hearers do
know to what they therefore should know. “Being then God’s offspring,” he
let your holy one see corruption” (Psalm 16:10), while also observing that David “both died and
was buried” (Acts 2:29), that he “was laid with his fathers and saw corruption” (Acts 13:36).
Because their audiences did know these things, they also should have known that David spoke
prophetically of another.

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If such apostolic approaches to Christian witness are recognized at least
as exemplary—though not necessarily normative—the question raised for the
contemporary Christian concerns the manner in which some common ground
or point of contact might be established with modern unbelievers. While a virtually infinite number of specific contexts in which personal evangelism might
take place will preclude any attempt to address such a question with specific
details, some general observations might be offered on the basis of Scripture
itself, as well as in light of the broader contours of modern culture.
Most fundamentally, though perhaps least obviously, the biblical attestation of a universally possessed natural knowledge of God reveals that there
exists already, regardless of context, a commonly shared knowledge of God’s
existence. It is this biblical testimony, for instance, that informs the assertion
of Johannes Quenstedt quoted above: “Even those who deny that God is, still
they are not ignorant that God is.”150 It would of course hardly be prudent
in conversation with professed atheists, for example, to imply that they are
simply lying about their disbelief. Nonetheless, the Christian’s trust in the
scriptural confession that all men do in some respect and to some extent
recognize God’s existence—and only succeed in denying it by actively suppressing this truth (Rom. 1:18)—might inspire some confidence in the often
daunting task of sharing one’s faith with professed unbelievers. As even one
recent survey of scientific studies examining the belief-forming mechanisms
of the human mind concludes, “when atheism does battle with supernaturalism over the hearts and minds of people, the playing field is not level from
the beginning.”151 It is also noteworthy in this regard that some prominent
skeptics seem to recognize this as true. One skeptic laments, for example,
that “our brains seem predisposed” and are “entirely accustomed to the idea
that complex elegance is an indicator of premeditated, crafted design,” such

150
A similar claim is made, e.g., by dogmatician David Hollaz (1648–1713), who refers to atheists being so “not speculatively, but practically.” That is, they may live as if there is no God, but
to some extent they still understand that there is a God. Hollaz, Examen Theologiae Acroamaticae,
quoted in Pelikan, “Natural Theology in David Hollaz,” 260.
151
Justin L. Barrett, Born Believers: The Science of Children’s Religious Belief (New York: Free
Press, 2012), 218–19. Though Barrett provides no information on the religion (or lack thereof) of
the various researchers whose work he surveys and summarizes, it is worth emphasizing that
the many studies he cites appear in peer-reviewed academic journals not typically known to be
biased in favor of religious belief.

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2016 Convention Workbook